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Based on a sample of 71 companies that follow U.S. GAAP and 41 companies 
that follow IFRS for the period between 2005 and 2010, I examine: a) the impact of 
different approaches in accounting standards, FASB Statement 140 (control-based) and 
IAS 39 (risk-based approach), on earnings management (measured by meeting/beating 
analysts’ forecast) using fair-value accounting in securitization transactions; b) the 
association between securitization gain and change in the value-relevance of an 
accounting performance measure, return on equity (ROE); c) the association between 
securitization gain and earnings management after controlling for the components of a 
firm’s competitive advantage; d) the joint effect of IFRS and the level of investor 
protection on earnings management using securitization transactions.  
I use multivariate linear regression and nonlinear Logit models with panel and 
cross-sectional data. My contributions to the literature are: a) I shed light on the 
controversy about fair-value accounting in relation to securitization; b) in relation to 
FASB Statement 140 (FASB ASC 860) and IAS 39, I provide evidence to support the 
idea of convergence of accounting standards; c) I show that IFRS is effective under any 
level of investor protection. To the best of my knowledge, these issues are not addressed 
in prior studies. 
 For companies following U.S. GAAP, I show evidence of earnings management 




that the discount rate is not used for manipulating fair value of retained interest (partial 
interest in secured assets), and there is no positive relationship between securitization 
gain and competitive advantage for any time period. Also there is no indication of 
earnings management for the 2008-2010 periods.   
I find that the IFRS regulations associated with securitization are intense and 
reduce the extent of earnings management under any level of investor protection. 
Furthermore, my findings show that in the first two periods, 2005-2006 and 2008-2009, 
companies that operate under strong anti-director laws experience higher securitization 
gain. It appears that the securitization market is more efficient in countries where 
investors are granted more power to exercise their rights. Lastly, the results do not show 
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Securitization is a method of financing, but manipulation in securitization 
transactions has the potential to affect many stakeholders. In the United States alone, $2 
trillion of the debt issued in 2006 were securitized assets (Securitization Market 
Activity.png 2010). During 2005 Hong Kong’s securitization activities increased by 84 
percent compare to the previous year (Banking Policy Departmen 2005). Furthermore, 
the Chinese firms’ use of securitization is also an indication of the popularity of 
securitization activities. The fast expansion of financing through securitization shows the 
importance of securitization transactions in the world, including in the United States. 
Securitization is a popular financing tool that involves several parties. Through 
securitization of financial assets, the seller can create cash and transfer the risk of holding 
receivables to another party (Dechow et al. 2010). The buyer of receivables finances the 
purchase by issuing securities, backed by expected future cash flows of securitized assets, 
to a third party. Depending on how management constructs the transaction, securitization 
can be accounted for as a sales transaction or it can be recorded as a secured borrowing, 
which results in an increase in the company’s leverage. Managers have incentives to 
construct the securitization transaction to meet the sale criteria, which does not increase 
the leverage, but does create immediate access to cash, improves efficiency ratios, and 
increases profits (Dechow and Shakespeare 2009). Accounting standards that govern 




controversial. Skeel (2011) posits that only a small group of Americans was really 
familiar with the securitization process until they witnessed their tax money being used to 
save large failing banks and financial institutions1. Furthermore, a study by Niu and 
Richardson (2006) shows that investors believe that the value-relevance of earnings is 
higher when securitization gain is not included in earnings. 
Critics have argued that the flexibility and vagueness of the existing fair-value 
accounting standards contributed to the recent financial crisis (Wallison 2008a & 2008b; 
Whalen 2008; Forbes 2009). Prior studies argue that accounting standards for 
securitization under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are more rigid 
compared to the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) 
(Adhikari and Betancourt 2008). Using a sample of 96 U.S. firms, Dechow et al. (2010) 
show that managers use fair-value accounting to manage earnings through securitization.  
Using a different time period than that of Dechow et al. (2010) and including 
companies that follow IFRS, I investigate whether easier criteria for securitization under 
U.S. GAAP allow managers to use fair-value accounting to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts, 
and whether I can find similar results for companies complying with IFRS for 
securitization. My study differs from that of Dechow et al. (2010) in three main aspects. 
First, they selected a sample from the period between 2000 and 2005, which is before the 
financial crisis of 2007, while I selected a time, 2005-2010, that covers periods both 
before and after the financial crisis. Second, my study includes the effect of the new 
                                                             
1 At this point, the public had lost faith in the regulatory system. In order to assure 
Americans, the Dodd-Frank Act, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, was 




standard set after 2005 for fair-value accounting2. Third, I investigate the role of 
securitization in earnings management, measured by meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts, 
under U.S. GAAP and IFRS.  
For securitization transactions, U.S. companies before 2010 followed completely 
different rules under SFAS 140 (ASC 860)3 than companies that complied with IFRS for 
securitization under IAS 39. My study is important because there are continuous efforts 
from European and U.S. standard-setters to converge national accounting standards with 
a set of globally-accepted high-quality accounting standards. It is important to see how 
SFAS 166 has narrowed the gap in accounting standards between U.S. GAAP and IFRS.  
In this dissertation, I have three objectives, which are the topics of my three-paper 
dissertation. The first objective deals with the opportunistic behavior of managers when 
                                                             
2 In order to reduce the differences between accounting standards set by FASB and ISBA 
in regard to financial assets and securitizations activities, FASB, in June of 2009, published 
statement no. 166, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets, which was a revision to 
Statement no. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities. This new standard requires more disclosures on transfer of 
financial assets, specifically when firms retain partial interest in the transferred assets, which 
consequently exposes the firm to risk. The new regulation has also set new criteria for 
derecognizing financial assets. Under this statement, “qualifying special-purpose entity” is 
eliminated.  The Financial statements prepared from the beginning of 2010 should reflect the 
impact of the new standard. The new standard influences my papers as well; therefore, I expand 
my data from 2005 to 2010 to show the impact of differences in accounting standards and the 
impact of the new standard.                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 SFAS 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities, is now FASB ASC 860. FASB’s Accounting Standards 
Codification is an online storage of current U.S. GAAP organized based on topics and into two 
levels of guidance (authoritative and non-authoritative). FASB ASC 860 is about transfer and 





using fair-value accounting in securitization transactions. There are several reasons for 
managers to manipulate earnings upward or downward. Their actions could be totally 
protective of the company or out of concern for their own interests. Managers are 
concerned with the company’s reputation, credit rating, stock value, and investors’ 
reactions, as well as their own bonuses and compensation. Managers use different 
approaches to achieve earnings targets.  
In the first paper, I investigate whether managers take advantage of the easier 
criteria of SFAS 140 (risk based) compared to IAS 39 (control based) for securitization, 
and use fair-value accounting to manage earnings. Considering the changes in accounting 
standards and the possibility of convergence, the question is “Would accounting under 
IFRS change the opportunistic behaviors of managers?” 
Managers also can time the securitization transactions to show higher income at 
the end of the period, or they can use a “cherry-picking” approach, which means selling 
assets with higher price appreciation to show higher gains. Securitization gain may also 
result from a company’s competitive advantage and not earnings management. Therefore, 
the second objective that I am addressing relates to a prior study by Barth and Taylor 
(2010) that suggests that managers do not need to manage earnings when their companies 
have a unique ability to generate more financial assets (i.e., loans) and earn positive 
income by selling them. Thus, my second paper investigates whether the source of 
securitization gain is a) earnings management or b) competitive advantage.  
Countries that permit/require their firms to adopt IFRS are governed by different 




that accounting standards are more effective in countries with stronger investor-
protection laws (e.g., Hung 2001; Leuz et al. 2003). Furthermore, prior studies show that 
investors value earnings more when the earnings exclude securitization gain (e.g., Niu 
and Richardson 2004). Therefore, my last objectives are to examine the impact of 
securitization gain on the value-relevance of an accounting measure for companies that 
follow U.S. GAAP, as well as to examine the dual effect of IFRS and investor protection 
on earnings management for companies that have adopted IFRS and operate under 
different legal systems.  
My dissertation provides several contributions. First, my dissertation sheds light 
on the controversy about fair-value accounting in relation to securitization. Second, in 
relation to SFAS 140 and IAS 39, I provide evidence to support the idea of convergence 
of accounting standards with the IFRS. Also, by expanding the observations to the end of 
2010, this dissertation provides evidence on the improvement of financial reporting with 
regard to securitization as a result of the new SFAS 166 (an amendment to SFAS 140, 
FASB ASC 860). Third, I offer an explanation as to whether securitization gain is merely 
the result of a manager’s discretion or a result of the company’s competitive advantage.  
Fourth, the findings show whether IFRS, which claims to consist of high-quality 
accounting standards, is more effective in an environment with more investor protection. 
Finally, in the last part of the dissertation, I investigate the impact of securitization gain 
on the value-relevance of return on equity. To the best of my knowledge, these issues 
have not been investigated or addressed in prior studies. 




Research Questions for Paper 1: 
What is the impact of different approaches of specific accounting standards, IAS 39 (risk-
based approach) and SFAS 140 (control-based approach), on meeting analysts’ forecasts 
using fair-value accounting in securitization transactions? Does the new statement, SFAS 
166, improve securitization accounting? 
Research Question for Paper 2: 
Is there any association between securitization gain and meeting analysts’ forecasts after 
controlling for the components of the firm’s competitive advantage? 
Research Questions for Paper 3: 
a) Does securitization gain decrease the value-relevance of return on equity as a proxy for 
the accounting performance measure? 
b) What is the joint effect of IFRS and investor protection on meeting analysts’ forecasts 
using securitization transactions (risk-based approach)? 
The remainder of this dissertation continues with a background on securitization, 
fair-value accounting, and each paper’s executive summaries, followed by the three 
papers.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In the following, I provide information about key topics that are closely related to 
the research questions raised and discussed in this dissertation.  
Fair-Value Accounting 
In economies in which the capital market is a source of financing, the 




2009).Therefore, accounting regulators, the FASB and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), have established standards to improve the quality of financial 
reporting; however, we still face many challenges. The SEC is strongly-focused on 
determining factors and issues related to valuation methods. Beside the standard-setters, 
consulting and auditing companies are also concerned with the measurement issues in the 
valuation of financial instruments, and they have conducted many studies to investigate 
these issues (e.g., Deaconu et al. 2009). 
It is true that at the time of issuance or purchase of assets and liabilities, the 
historical cost and market/fair value are generally the same, but over time, historical 
accounting fails to recognize the changes in the value of assets and liabilities. 
Consequently, a company’s financial figures do not reflect the true performance (Wallace 
2006). In addition, historical cost-accounting has been criticized for not offering relevant 
and up-to-date information to investors and other users of financial reports. 
Consequently, the FASB has made a radical change and recommended the use of fair-
value accounting, and required firm provision of additional disclosures of important 
information such as interim disclosure of financial instruments’ fair value, techniques 
used for fair-value estimation, and inputs to recurring and non-recurring fair-value 
measurements (Grant Thornton  2010).   
The FASB and the IASB have recently been promoting the adoption of fair-value 
accounting since both organizations believe that fair-value accounting produces relevant 
financial information (Barlev and Haddad 2003; Landsman  2006;  Fiechter  2010). 




recent financial crisis on fair-value accounting (Laux and Leuz  2009, 2010). Prior 
studies argue that the flexibility offered by fair-value accounting creates opportunities for 
management to manipulate earnings (Dechow et al. 2010). 
SFAS 157, Fair-Value Accounting Measurements 
Under historical cost accounting, assets are recognized at their market value at the 
time of purchase, and any appreciation in their value is unrecognized until assets are 
removed from the owners’ books. However, a decrease in the value of assets is 
recognized immediately. Even though historical cost-accounting provides reliable 
information because the purchase price of an asset is known and clear, the data based on 
historical cost-accounting lacks relevancy because an asset’s market value is often not the 
same as its purchased value, and users of financial statements need up-to-date 
information to make decisions. On the other hand, under fair-value accounting, any 
increase or decrease in the value of assets will affect financial statements.  The difficulty 
with recording assets at their fair value is that some assets are not traded in the market 
regularly, and the determination of their market/fair value is based on management 
estimations which are subject to their opportunistic decisions.    
To reduce the problem with fair-value estimation, FASB issued SFAS 157 (now 
FASB ASC topic 820)4, a guideline that uses different levels of input to assess the value 
of assets and liabilities. The first levels of input are prices of identical assets from 
transactions by dealers in active markets. However, when identical assets are not 
                                                             
4 SFAS 157 was codified into FASB Accounting Standard Codification Topic 820, Fair 




available, models which use the second-level inputs, prices of similar assets and other 
related data, should be employed to value assets and liabilities. In cases where identical 
or similar assets are not available, level-three inputs, unobservable inputs (models), are 
used in assessing the value of assets and liabilities.  
Starting with level-two inputs and increasing with level three, the ambiguity of 
estimation creates opportunities for discretion and manipulation by management. 
Deaconu et al. (2009) argue that currently SFAS 157 is the only professional guidance in 
the United States with clear direction for fair-value determination for financial-reporting 
purposes. Nevertheless, even though SFAS 157 offers helpful guidance for fair-value 
measurement, when the market value of the retained portion of a securitized asset is not 
available, managers are able to take advantage of the flexibility of fair-value estimation to 
manipulate gain from securitization (Bartov 1993; Karaoglu  2005; Dechow et al. 2010).  
Securitization 
Since the early 1970s, firms have been securitizing their financial assets, such as 
receivables, often to a special-purpose entity, which in turn issues securities backed by 
the expected cash flows from the securitized assets. This practice has become very 
popular all over the world. In the United States alone, close to four trillion dollars of 
issued debts were mortgaged or asset-backed securitized bonds during 20035. During the 
same period in the European countries, securitized debts reached more than 217 billion 
Euros (Adhikari and Betancourt 2008). 
                                                             





Figure 1 shows the structure of a simple securitization, in which a company 
transfers pools of assets, such as trade receivables, to a Special-Purpose Entity (SPE), 
which issues securities backed by the expected cash flows from the transferred assets and 
pays cash from the sale of securities to transferring firms (Adhikari and Betancourt 
2008). A servicing company, usually the transferring company, collects the cash flows.  
 
There are many problems related to the accounting for securitization transactions 
that both the FASB and the IASB have been trying to solve. U.S. companies have been 
following SFAS 140 (FASB ASC 860) since 2000, and most international companies are 




2003. SFAS 140 is based on the financial-component approach that focuses on transfer of 
control, while IAS 39 emphasizes the transfer of risk. The main issue under both 
standards is whether the transaction qualifies as a sale of assets or as a secured 
borrowing. Under SFAS 140, it is not hard for managers to construct the securitization as 
a sales transaction even when the company maintains partial interest in the asset.  
Securitization can generate a gain through different approaches, including:  
1- Real earnings management: Firms securitize assets to increase earnings when 
managers expect low or volatile earnings. 
2- Cherry-picking: Based on historical cost-accounting, assets are reported at their costs 
when purchased, and the difference between their cost and fair value is recognized as 
a gain/loss when assets are sold. Therefore, for the purpose of securitization, 
managers can pick and sell those assets which appreciated most.   
3- Accounting policies and rules: In situations in which the transferor retains interest in 
the securitized assets, fair-value accounting is used to estimate the value of retained 
interest when its market value is not available. The estimation of asset value is subject 
to the manager’s discretion6.   
4- Timing of transaction: Managers can also time the securitization transaction to have 
higher earnings at the end of the reporting period. 
Table 1-1 is a summary of securitization-related issues and benefits. As an example, 
securitization can increase profit and improve the efficiency ratios.  
                                                             
6 In 2009 FASB published Statement no. 166, a revision to FASB 140. The new standard has 




Table 1-1: Summary of Securitization and Related Issues. 
Securitization What can be securitized Benefits Who securitized 
Securitization is a 
process by which  
 
1-intangible and 
liquid assets are 
monetized into cash 
 
2-risk related to the 
specific assets are 
separated from the 
transferor’s (i.e., the 
originator ) own 
credit and operating 
risk, and  
 
3-securities are 
issued to investors 
which are designed 
for the specific risk 




-Home equity mortgage 
loans 
-Commercial real estate 
mortgage loans 
 -Automobile loans 
 -Automobile leases 
 -Boat loans 
 -Credit card receivables 
 -Student loans 
 -Equipment loans 
 -Time share loans 
 -Manufactured housing 
loans 
 -Legal fees 
 -Aircraft leases 
 -Franchisee loans 
 Trade receivables 
 -Insurance receivables 
 -Leveraged buyout 
loans 
 -Healthcare receivable 
 -High yield securities 
 -Repackaged securities 
 -Tax liens 
 -Non-performing loans 
 -Industrial loans 
 -Future flow 
receivables 
 -Royalty receivable 
 -Motorcycle loans 
 -Mutual fund fees 
  
1-the securitization markets are very 
active and well developed, 
 
2- issuers of asset backed securities 
can access both the public and 
private markets quickly, 
 
3-many domestic and foreign 
investors purchase asset backed 
securities, so the sponsors of 
securitization can secure an 
alternative base of investors from 
their investor based for equity of 
debt offerings, 
 
4-the asset backed securities are 
structured with certain credit 
enhancements and the credit rating 
of such securities can be higher than 
the rating of originator or sponsor of 
the securitization, 
 
5-intnagible and illiquid asset can 
be monetized into cash, and 
 
6-from an accounting standpoint, so 
long as the securitization complies 
fully with the accounting rules for 
sale accounting treatment, an 
originator can achieve “off-Balance 
Sheet Treatment”, which means that 
the liabilities of the Issuing SPE 
resulting from the issuance of the 
asset backed securities are not 
consolidated with or recognized by 
the originator on its balance sheet, 
but the cash proceeds realized from 
the sale of the assets are recognized 
by the originator on its balance 
sheet, thus enhancing the 













have too much 









markets are not 
receptive to the 
companies’ 
offering of new 
debt or equity, or  
 




by their credit 
arrangements. 






International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)   
Before the adoption of IFRS, European countries followed their own domestic 
accounting standards. In an attempt to make financial information more comparable 
across countries, standard-setters developed IFRS, a common set of standards claimed to 
produce comparable and informative financial reports and reduce the information 
asymmetry between companies and their investors. Therefore, investors’ costs of 
collecting, processing, and comparing information are expected to decline.  
Armstrong et al. (2010) find positive reaction to European countries’ adoption of 
IFRS and interpret this result as an indication that investors perceive IFRS adoption as 
having greater benefits than costs in the adoption and implementation of new standards. 
Nonetheless, Armstrong et al. (2010) in further tests find that investors in countries in 
which the enforcement of accounting standards is not strong are concerned about the 
implementation of IFRS.  
The European Union (EU) has been focusing on the integration of capital markets 
across countries and, hence, from the beginning of 2005, all companies listed on the 
European Union stock exchange are required to prepare their annual financial statements 
using IFRS.  
Even though the IASB issues IFRS, the European Commission (EC), which is a 
private-sector standard setter, needs to approve the standards proposed by the IASB 
before companies in EU countries are required to apply them.  Furthermore, the EC 
accepts a standard only when it meets three main criteria:  




2- Using standards should produce understandable, reliable, relevant, and comparable 
reports.  
3- Standards should be beneficial to all stakeholders in Europe. 
New technology, advanced communication devices, Internet, and speedy 
transportation have expanded the market for business and have reduced the barriers of 
transactions and contracts across countries. The international market creates 
opportunities. At the same time, it means that firms have to deal with different cultures 
and business environments. To mitigate the problems associated with international 
business, countries around the world have been trying to harmonize the accounting 
standards, and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) is the organization 
that is responsible for setting standards to achieve the harmonization.  
 Before 2005, about 100 countries either required or allowed their listed 
companies to apply IFRS, the standards set by IASB (Brackney and Witmer 2005); 
however, the current number of companies has increased to 117 (Chadha 2010 ). The 
United States is a longtime supporter of the accounting harmonization and has entered 
into an agreement for convergence of U.S. GAAP and IFRS (Norwalk Agreement 2002). 
Even the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the FASB to focus on international 
convergence and high-quality standards. Nevertheless, early in 2010, the SEC announced 
(following SEC Roadmap 2008) that firms cannot start applying IFRS before 2015 
(Johnson and Leone 2010). It seems that the SEC’s decision is not exactly what 




American CEOs would like to have the option of IFRS adoption before 2015 (Chadha 
2010).  
Comparing SFAS 140 (ASC 860) with IAS 39 
The two standards differ in their accounting rules for securitization. SFAS 140, 
which is based on a financial-component approach and focuses on transfer of control, 
allows for sales accounting if control is either complete or partial. Under IAS 39, which 
focuses on the transfer of risk, firms use various measurement methods based on 
managers’ intention toward financial assets.  Under SFAS No. 140, transfer of financial 
assets is a sale when: 
1- The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor, 
2- The transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the assets, and 
3- The transferor does not maintain effective control over the assets (ASC 860). 
The first condition assures that in the case of financial problems, the transferor’s 
creditors have no access to the securitized assets. If these three conditions hold, then the 
transaction qualifies as a sale, the revenue is recognized and the asset is removed from 
the transferor’s books, and the carrying value of the transferred asset is allocated among 
the new financial components based on fair values. If any of the above conditions are not 
met, then the transaction is considered to be a secured borrowing, in which case the level 
of the transferor’s leverage will increase.  
Accounting for securitization under IAS 39 differs significantly from accounting 
under SFAS 140. Following IAS 39, we first determine the portion of a financial asset 




to apply the de-recognition test for the entire asset even if the transferor is transferring 
only a portion of the financial asset. In special cases, however, such as when the 
transferred portion includes one of the: a) explicitly identified cash flows, b) fully 
proportionate share of explicitly identified cash flows, or c) fully proportionate share of 
cash flows, the de-recognition test is not applied. 
The next steps are the de-recognition steps, starting with checking whether the 
asset’s cash flow has expired. An asset is de-recognized when its cash flow has expired; 
otherwise, we need to establish whether a transfer has happened or not. A transfer takes 
place when the contractual right to the cash flow of a financial asset is transferred, or the 
contractual right to the cash flow is retained and the cash flow is transferred to a third 
party given the following three specific conditions: 
1- The transferor must pass all the collected cash flows without any delay; however, the 
transferor can invest the cash flows in cash or cash equivalents. 
2- The transferor can sell securities only to pay the third party, 
3- The transferor is obligated to transfer only the cash flows collected. 
If the above conditions are not met, then the asset cannot be de-recognized. When 
the above conditions are met, the next step is to check the transfer of the risks and 
rewards. An asset is de-recognized when substantially all the risks and rewards are 
transferred7.   
                                                             
7 Note: In order to decide whether risks and rewards have been transferred, we need to 
compare the entity’s exposure to variability in the amount and timing of the transferred asset’s net 
cash flows before and after transfer. When this variability in relation to changes in the transferred 
asset’s future net cash flows is not significant, then substantially all the risks and rewards have 




Adhikari and Betancourt (2008) argue that in most securitizations, neither of the 
two situations (retaining or transferring substantially all the risks and rewards) happens, 
and as a result, in most securitizations under IAS 39, we need to examine the control over 
the asset to determine the de-recognition. In transactions where the transferee is able to 
sell the transferred asset to a third party, control is transferred (not retained) and the asset 
is de-recognized. However, since in securitization transactions, an entity sells the assets 
to a special-purpose entity (SPE) which is not permitted to sell transferred assets, in most 
securitizations, control is retained by the transferor, and we should look at the form of 
control retained by the transferor.  
The criteria for meeting the sales transaction under SFAS Statement 140 are 
easier than those under IAS 39, allowing managers to structure the securitization as sales 
transactions even when they retain partial interest in the securitized assets. Consequently, 
managers can use subjective assumptions to manipulate earnings through fair-value 
valuation of the retained interest.   
The challenging issue relating to securitization for followers of both the U.S. 
GAAP and the IFRS is the accounting for securitization transaction. Deciding on whether 
the transaction is a sale of an asset or is a secured borrowing creates problems. Secured 
borrowing increases the liabilities, while the sale of an asset requires the removal of the 
asset from the balance sheet and recognition of gain/loss (the difference between 
proceeds received and book value of the asset). Therefore, the criteria employed in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
does not change, then substantially all the risks and rewards have been retained (Adhikari and 





deciding whether the transaction is a sale or secured borrowing will result in different 
financial numbers. Under SFAS 140, a financial-components control approach is used, 
while under IAS 39, a risk and reward and financial-components approach is used.  




Comparisons of Provisions of SFAS 140 and IAS 39 
 
Issue SFAS 140 IAS 39 
De-
recognition 





Control is surrendered if three tests 
are met: 
1. Assets must be isolated from the 
transferor  and the transferor’s 
creditors 
2.Ttransferee can freely pledge or 
exchange Transferred assets 
3. Transferor does not effectively 
maintain control through a 
repurchase agreement 
 
If these three conditions are met, the  
transferor records a “sale” using the  
financial components approach. If 
the three conditions are not met, the 
transaction is accounted for as a 
secured borrowing 
Risk and Rewards and Financial 
Components Control Model. Also 
adds concept of “continuing 
enrolment” 
 
Multiple steps required to evaluate 
de-recognition: 
Pre de-recognition step: 
1. Determine if all or part of asset 
must be evaluated 
 
De-recognition steps: 
1. Evaluate if rights to cash flows 
expired 
2. Determine if transfer has taken 
place 
3. Apply risk and reward approach  
4. Apply control approach 
5. Apply continuing involvement  
Essentially, starting with de-
recognition step 1, at each step, an 
entity evaluates whether d-
recognition and/or recognition is 
appropriate. If no conclusion is 
reached, the entity moves on to the 
next step. 






 III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES 
In the first paper, CHAPTER II, I investigate U.S. companies that are engaged in 
securitization transactions and test the possibility of earnings management using 
securitization. I find evidence of earnings management using securitization for the period 
2005-2006 (before the financial crisis) for companies following U.S. GAAP. My results 
do not support the discount-rate hypothesis. That is, the discount rate, as well as fair 
value, is not the main source of earnings management. One possible explanation for the 
observed positive association between meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts and 
securitization gain during 2005-2006 is that under SFAS No. 140, the conditions for 
sales-accounting securitization were easily met, and managers were able to manage 
earnings. I did not find the same results for 2008-2009 because during this period, 
companies were under more scrutiny as they faced financial difficulties. Under this 
condition, the opportunity for securitization was low, and managers became more 
conservative (a claim that has not yet been empirically tested).  
In the second paper, CHAPTER III, I study U.S. companies that have reported a 
securitization gain during 2005-2006 (before the financial crisis), 2008-2009 (after the 
crisis), and 2010 (when financial statements reflect the impact of SFAS Statement 166). 
The result of regression analysis is that there is a significant association between 
meeting/beating earnings forecast and securitization gain during the period before the 
crisis, indicating that the earnings management is the source of securitization gain and not 
competitive advantage. However, there is no positive correlation between securitization 




earnings management for the period 2008-2010. It is argued, but not yet proven, that 
companies have become more conservative since the issuance of SFAS 166.   
Finally, in the third paper, CHAPTER IV, I first study IFRS companies that are 
engaged in securitization transactions, and test the possibility that earnings management 
using securitization transactions among companies that operate under different legal 
systems and anti-director laws is less. My findings indicate that companies that are 
engaged in securitization transactions and operate under IFRS, on average, exhibit no 
earnings management. The explanation I suggest is that IFRS regulations with regard to 
securitization are intense enough to reduce the extent of manipulation of financial 
statements under any type of investor protection. Then I use all U.S. companies that are 
engaged in securitization transactions to examine the value-relevance of an accounting-
performance measure, return on equity. My findings indicate that, in the first period 
(2005-2006), the value-relevance of return on equity decreases as a result of 













PAPER ONE: FAIR VALUE, SECURITIZATION,  
AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970s, securitization has become a popular method of raising capital. 
However, securitization transaction is highly complex and can create information 
asymmetry between management and investors. Some investors are informed, understand 
the complexity, and can make educated decisions. Credit-rating agencies, to some degree, 
are able to inform the public and reduce the information asymmetries (Iscobucci et al. 
2006). Nevertheless, the complexities related to the securitization process still can allow 
managers to act opportunistically and offer low-value (high-risk) assets to less-informed 
investors. 
Prior research claims that managers can generate gains from securitization by 
taking advantage of the flexibilities incorporated in fair-value accounting rules when 
estimating the value of securitized assets (Dechow et al. 2010). Dechow et al. (2010) 
show that managers use rules of fair-value accounting to pick a discount rate that creates 
higher gain when estimating the fair value of securitized assets. The main goal of my first 
paper is to investigate the prior study’s findings, extend their research further by looking 
at a different timeframe, and also to investigate companies following IAS 39 for 
securitization transactions. I posit and show that under U.S. GAAP, managers do use 
securitization to meet/beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. I also show that IFRS’ rigid rules 




Securitization is a complex process and involves fair-value accounting, which is 
criticized for being flexible. However, both the Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) promote fair-value 
accounting to increase the information-relevance of financial reports (Barlev and Haddad  
2003; Landsman 2006; Fiechter 2010). On the other hand, critics of fair-value accounting 
blame the flexibility and subjectivity of fair-value accounting for many economic 
problems and financial crises (Laux and Leuz 2009, 2010). Consequently, the 
shortcoming of fair-value accounting affects accounting for asset securitization because 
fair-value estimation is used in securitization transactions when the transferor of assets 
retains partial interest in the sold assets (Karaoglu 2005; Hunton et al. 2006; Dechow et 
al. 2010). Depending on how management constructs the transaction, securitization can 
be accounted for as a sales transaction or it can be recorded as a secured borrowing, 
which means an increase in the firm’s leverage. Securitizations can open the door to 
earnings manipulation and other unacceptable practices by managers. Managers can use 
securitizations to manipulate earnings, transfer risky assets to third parties, and be lenient 
in giving credit to customers with no or bad credit (Dechow et al. 2010). 
  Another issue that of late has been extensively and inconclusively debated by 
regulators, standard-setters, the global investment community, and the accounting 
profession is the convergence of the U.S. GAAP and International Financial Accounting 
Standards (IFRS) to create a higher-quality set of accounting standards. Standard-setters 
around the world are trying to create a single set of accounting standards that produces 




have subsidiaries or branches in more than one country, and investors prefer financial 
reports that are more comparable and understandable.    
Lately, a number of studies have focused on the issues related to the convergence 
of the U.S. GAAP and IFRS.  Examples of these issues are the market reactions to 
companies adopting IFRS and managerial discretion under IFRS standards (Hamberg et 
al. 2009; Armstrong et al. 2010). Since the main focus of this dissertation is 
securitization, and studying securitization involves many other issues, such as accounting 
policies across countries and accounting requirements under U.S. GAAP and IFRS, these 
issues are examined in relation to each other as a holistic approach. Fair-value 
accounting, securitization, and investor protection have not been fully studied in 
combination.  
An important question for participants in the U.S. capital market is whether 
convergence with international accounting standards would benefit the U.S. economy. 
The accounting standards of both U.S. GAAP and IFRS have been challenged in terms of 
their complexity, relevance, and usefulness, so the main purpose of this dissertation is to 
address these challenges in relation to the securitization process.  I expect my results to 
provide evidence to support the standard-setters’ efforts to evaluate the possibility of total 
convergence of the two standards. Investors also need to have access to higher-quality 
reports and to assess which method better protects their wealth against the opportunistic 




The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  First, I offer background and 
explanation on some important issues, and then continue with hypothesis development, 
data collection, empirical tests, results, and conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Earnings Management 
Most associates of firms base their relationship with the company on the firm’s 
earnings. The firm’s senior executives are evaluated and rewarded based on company 
earnings (Healy 1985), most banks give loans to companies with good performance, and 
boards of directors use earnings to evaluate the management.  Therefore, if the earnings 
are below the analysts’ expectations, the company may face many problems, such as 
difficulty in raising capital, purchasing supplies, keeping valuable employees, and 
sustaining a good reputation, as well as losing stock value, and many others.  
To investigate the importance of earnings, Graham et al. (2005) conducted a 
survey which showed that more than 73 percent of the 400 interviewed CFOs revealed 
that analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) is very important, and meeting that 
forecast is critical. Also, 65% of participants admitted that reporting a profit is important 
enough to manipulate earnings (Graham et al. 2005). According to the financial press, the 
following three benchmarks are very important to a company’s CEO: 1- showing profit, 
2- having sustainable earnings, and 3-meeting analysts’ forecasts (Degeorge et al. 1999).    
Considering the importance of earnings, studies find that managers use several 
methods of managing earnings, starting with using accruals (which is very common), 




(Subramanyam 1996; Lee 2007). On the other hand, Cahan et al. (2008) show that 
managers use income-smoothing in order to communicate with investors about the 
company’s future.   
Other studies show that U.K. firms actually avoid missing analysts' forecasts; 
specifically, they show that managers in the U.K. generally don’t like negative-earnings 
surprises (Gore et al. 2007; Athanasakou et al. 2009). Also, studies have shown that the 
market perceives negative-earnings surprises as bad news and rewards positive-earnings 
surprises (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Athanasakou et al. 2009). Brown and Caylor (2005) 
show evidence of a significant increase in rewards (penalty) of meeting (missing) 
earnings forecasts. Consequently, managers are very concerned about analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. 
Furthermore, a prior study shows that earnings management is a common practice 
all over the world; however, companies in European countries manage earnings more 
often than their American counterparts (Leuz et al. 2003).  Following prior studies (e.g., 
Degeorge et al.1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Graham et al. 2005; Lee 2007), I use 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for earnings management.  
Fair-Value Accounting 
Research shows that fair-value accounting and its required disclosures produce 
information that investors value; however, the quality and amount of information depend 
on the measurement and estimation methods used by managers (Landsman 2006).  The 
SEC strongly supports fair-value accounting (as the sole accounting method) based on the 




behavior using the existing complexity of mixed accounting standards (historical and 
fair-value) (Landsman 2006).  Paananen (2009) finds evidence that investors value the 
increase in the level of disclosures required by fair-value accounting because by using the 
fair-value accounting, they believe they can better predict the company’s future 
performance and make better and more educated decisions. 
 Contrary to investors, preparers of financial reports believe that when unrealized 
gains and losses are included in income, the profit volatility will rise (Cloney 1996). 
Byrne et al. (2008) find that U.K. firms’ managers show different levels of conservatism 
in relation to the implementation of the fair-value accounting, and these variations (in 
their estimation) create inconsistencies in reports across different companies.    
  Most research on fair value is concerned with its flexibility in different areas, 
such as measurement of intangible assets (e.g., Deaconu et al. 2009). Fair-value 
estimation issues have also created concerns in relation to asset securitization, and many 
studies are devoted to this dilemma. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) examine how 
managers utilize the timing of asset securitization to increase the benefits of the 
transaction. A comprehensive comparison of securitization under the U.S. GAAP and the 
IFRS standard by Adhikari and Betancourt (2008) and management earnings-
manipulation in securitization by Dechow et al. (2010) are among other studies in this 
line of research. Even the SEC points out the problem with fair-value measurement for 
financial instruments that are not traded in the active market, and asset valuation based on 




Barlev and Haddad (2003) argue that fair-value accounting, unlike historical cost 
accounting, is more value-relevant and better portrays the real financial position and 
income of a company, helps limit agency costs, and improves management efficiency.  
Laux and Leuz (2009) investigated whether fair-value accounting really did cause 
economic problems and concluded that fair-value accounting could not have added to the 
financial and economic problems. Degeorge et al. (1999) and Brown and Caylor (2005) 
also show evidence that managers believe avoiding quarterly losses has the highest 
priority.   However, further research shows that managers’ concerns have changed 
recently, and the findings by Degeorge et al. (1999) are not applicable over time (Dechow 
et al. 2003; Graham et al. 2005). Additional investigation by Brown and Caylor (2005) 
shows that, in every sample year, managers are most concerned with avoiding negative 
earnings surprises. A good explanation for this result is that managers strongly favor the 
development of credibility with investors and other stakeholders and try to improve the 
company’s stock price (Graham et al. 2005). Managers are afraid of losing their jobs, 
their bonuses, the firm’s stock price, and their reputation. Consequently, they don’t want 
to miss earnings thresholds.     
Hypothesis Development 
Dechow et al. (2010) investigate the association between income-smoothing and 
the securitization gain of a sample of American firms during the period when SFAS No. 
140, which is based on a financial-component approach and focuses on transfer of 
control, was in effect. They show evidence of income-smoothing, and they relate this 




140, constructing the transaction as the sale of an asset and de-recognizing the asset is 
easily done, even when the transferor retains partial interest in the asset (Niu and 
Richardson 2006). Dechow et al. (2010) argue that since, under SFAS No. 140, the fair 
value of expected future cash flows of the retained portion of a securitized asset must be 
estimated when no active market value is available, managers are able to pick a discount 
rate that creates higher gains or lower losses.   
SFAS 140 follows the “surrender of control” concept to determine the accounting 
for securitized assets. If the transaction meets the specific criteria (explained earlier) and 
the transferor does not have control over the transferred assets, then the transaction is 
accounted as a sale. However, if the criteria are not met and the transferor retains control, 
then the transaction is accounted as a secured borrowing, the receivables remain on the 
transferor’s books, and any amount received in the transaction is recorded as borrowing. 
Accounting for securitization under IAS 39 is more complicated and follows a 
combination of “risk and reward” and “control” approaches. The criteria for de-
recognition under IAS 39 are rigid (Adhikari and Betancourt 2008); however, if 
transaction meets a set of criteria (explained earlier), and the transferor maintains control 
through withholding of a subordinated interest, then the transferor uses the financial-
component approach (control) and allocates the carrying value of the asset between the 
components based on fair values (Adhikari and Betancourt 2008). Adhikari and 




transaction and de-recognition of assets under U.S. GAAP (FAS 140) would not be 
qualified for de-recognition under IAS 391.  
Given that it is not possible to observe or calculate earnings manipulation directly, 
we need to examine the possibility of earnings management indirectly. According to the 
Agency Theory, there is a conflict of interest between management and investors. First, 
executives are typically motivated to engage in earnings management primarily because 
their compensation and bonuses are tied to the reported earnings, and when they have the 
opportunity to do so, they have the ability and knowledge to manipulate numbers to meet 
their earnings targets. Second, management also has an incentive to manipulate financial 
statements to comply with debt covenants. Since the standards issued by IASB over the 
last few years have changed the measurement method from historical cost to fair value, 
managers are able to estimate the fair value for assets that are not being traded in the 
actual market.  
The simplicity of criteria under SFAS 140 creates opportunities for managers to 
sell financial assets and generate gain using the flexibilities of fair-value accounting. 
However, rigid criteria for securitization under IAS 39 prevent managers’ discretionary 
actions. As a result, I expect to find earnings management measured by meeting/beating 
analysts’ forecast for companies complying with SFAS 140 only. The existence of 
incentives, along with the opportunities and capability to manipulate accounting numbers, 
                                                             
1 The accounting for securitization under standards set by the SFAS 140 and by the IASB 
(IAS 39) were very different; however, in 2009 the FASB issued a new standard (SFAS no.166) 
which reduces the differences between the two standards. Thus, this paper investigates the 




provide rationalization to management to engage in earnings management as stated in the 
following hypotheses2.  Given that meeting/beating analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
extensively used as a proxy for earnings management in prior studies (e.g., Degeorge et 
al. 1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Graham et al. 2005; Lee 2007), I have used the 
same proxy in my study.  
H1: There is positive association between meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts and 
securitization gain under both risk-based and control-based approach.  
 
 I test the above hypothesis for companies that follow U.S. GAAP (control-based 
or financial-components approach) and IFRS (risk-based approach) separately, and 
expect that my findings only support the hypothesis for companies that follow U.S. 
GAAP.  
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that the discount rate is the tool for showing 
securitization gain, so following their study, I investigate this claim and predict that there 
is a negative association between the discount rate and securitization gain under U.S. 
GAAP. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2: For companies that follow U.S. GAAP (control-based approach), there is a negative 
association between securitization gain and discount rate used in fair-value 
estimation. 
 
 III. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This section discusses the data collection and the methodology used in this study. 
 
 
                                                             
2 Earnings management in these hypotheses is defined as any attempt by management to meet 




Data Collection  
I used LexisNexis and several key words to find all companies in the U.S. and in 
the world that have used securitization transactions during the periods 2005-2006 and 
2008-2010 and have almost all of the related data. I have come up with a total of 355 
company-year observations for 71 companies that follow the U.S. GAAP, and a total of 
205 company-year observations for 41 companies that follow IFRS. Dechow et al. (2010) 
made a similar study in the period between 2000 and 2005 and collected a total of 96 
companies. Given that the size of securitization activities has declined significantly since 
the 2000-2005 period, I believe the chance I have missed any company that is engaged in 
securitization activities and have not included it in my list is extremely low. For IFRS3 
companies, the search was much harder since companies across countries use different 
terms for one concept. I used “securitisation”, “securitization”, “financial asset”, 
“receivable”, and many more key terms to find companies with securitization activities. I 
reviewed companies’ annual financial reports (10-K) and hand-collected the 
securitization data including income from securitizations, fair value of the retained 
interests (U.S. companies only) in securitized assets, and discount rates used in 
estimating fair values. LexisNexis and Google Finance were extremely helpful in finding 
companies’ financial reports, stock information, email addresses, and phone numbers.  
For the most part, non-U.S. companies did not report the discount rate that they 
had used to estimate fair value, and only mentioned that they used the related period’s 
                                                             
3 My data consists of companies which have adopted IFRS by 2005 (APRA 2004; PWC 




discount rate, so I had to look that up in a very time-consuming process. I used 
companies following U.S. GAAP and companies following IFRS to test the hypotheses. 
In addition, I used : a) the Research Insights (COMPUSTAT) database to collect the 
financial data, b) the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to collect 
monthly stock returns and stock prices, c) the SEC’s Edgar database to look at 
companies’ 10-K reports, d) the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to 
collect analysts’ earnings and return forecasts, and e) Lexis-Nexis and other online 
sources as well as direct phone calls and email to individuals in Europe.  
Under SFAS 1404, firms are required to provide more information, such as 
income from securitization, amount of gains, interest rates employed by managers, fair 
values of retained assets in securitization, and adverse changes at the end of the year. The 
data collection for companies following IFRS was complicated by the fact that each 
country has different requirements, and companies use different terminology for 
reporting the same concepts. In contrast to U.S. companies, which disclose information in 
a simple and straightforward method, IFRS companies are not required to disclose 
information such as the discount rate used in estimating fair value or the amount of 




                                                             
4 FASB statement no. 166, the revision to SFAS no. 140, has increased the required 






 In this paper, I investigate securitization under U.S. GAAP and IFRS and test 
whether managers take advantage of fair-value accounting to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts using gain on sale accounting securitization.  
Earnings management: 
As I mentioned earlier, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999; 
Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Graham et al. 2005; Lee 2007), I use meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for earnings management. I define MEET=1 when earnings 
surprise is non-negative and MEET= 0 when earnings surprise is negative. Earnings 
surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. There are some companies that normally do well year-after-year and meet the 
earnings forecasts regardless of securitization gain.  Consequently, if a company’s 
earnings before securitization gain do not meet the forecast and the company can 
construct a securitization that raises the income enough to meet or beat the forecast, then 
there is a high probability that the company is engaged in earnings management since the 
manager has discretion in estimating the fair value of retained interest in sold securities.  
Therefore, I use the following Logit model to test my first hypothesis (H1). I 
separately run the same model both for companies that follow the U.S. GAAP and 
companies that follow IFRS. The positive sign of the coefficient of SEC-GAIN supports 
my hypotheses. 
 
P (MEETit) = f ( β0 + β1SEC-GAINit +   β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3IND-GAINt+ β4 ADV-






MEETit: Is a dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and 
zero otherwise. Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and 
median analysts’ earnings forecasts for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S). 
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 
10K and it is scaled by last year’s stockholders equity. 
 PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is 
a proxy for manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are 
collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the SEC. 
Consistent with Dechow et al. (2010), I use the following control variables: 
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end 
of year t deflated by the stockholders’ equity.  
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of 
year t used as a proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in 
expected future cash flows of financial assets. 
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk. 
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values 
of assets5. 
Additional control variables used in this model are:  
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
                                                             





SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t. 
Investment Opportunity: 
  Depending on the efficiency and competitiveness of the industry, the size of 
spread6 should vary. To control for this variation in the industry, INDUSTRY-GAIN is 
defined as the median level of gains from securitizations deflated by equity in the 
industry by year. 
Receivables Cash Flows Volatility: 
 Dechow et al. (2010) use two proxies for risk because the volatility in expected 
cash flows from securitized receivables7 is not directly measurable. Managers use 
estimation to calculate the fair value of the retained interest in securitized assets as the 
present value of future expected cash flows8. The adverse change collected from notes 
and disclosures to financial statements represents an estimate of the variance related to 
the expected future cash flows (Dechow et al. 2010).Therefore, higher variance is 
indicative of higher volatility of assets. Consequently, firms with greater adverse change 
in relation to the retained securitization interest should show higher gains or losses. When 
estimating the fair value of retained interest in securitized assets, managers have to make 
assumptions about the discount rate used to calculate the present value of future expected 
                                                             
6 The difference between the asking price and the bid of stock or other security is called bid-
ask spread. 
7 Volatile cash flows increase the risk. 
8 U.S. companies report estimated fair value of the retained interest in securitization in their 
Balance Sheets. They also report the sensitivities of the estimated fair values to adverse changes 




cash flows, default risk, and prepayment risk. Therefore, a manager can show higher gain 
by assuming lower risk, which results in lower adverse change and higher gain. 
ADVERSE-CHANGE/RI: This is the first proxy for risk and is defined as adverse 
change divided by retained interest (from the 10-k filing). The second proxy for risk is 
the firm-specific market volatility (MAR-VOL). In some securitizations, the transferor 
assumes all the risks, which means that the third party is at no risk if the company faces 
financial problems (Gorton and Souleles 2006). Therefore, the volatility of the market 
should be directly related to the volatility of receivable cash flows. To calculate this 
variable, I first regress the monthly stock returns on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX 
index and then find the standard deviation of the residuals of this regression. 
DIS-RATE:The discount rate reported by the firm in the notes to the financial statement. 
Discount rate has an important role in the size of the gain from securitization transaction, 
and a lower (higher) discount rate can result in larger (smaller) gain. 
SEG: The number of segments in the company. Companies for which securitization is an 
important source of financing should have a higher gain (as a percentage of equity 
capital) when they operate in one segment only. 
Additional control variables: 
SIZE: The natural log of the market value of equity. Larger companies have more 
securities to use for financing.  
LEVERAGE: Total liabilities scaled by prior-year equity. Companies with a higher level 






Next, following the Dechow et al. (2010) argument that managers use desirable 
discount rates in the estimation of fair-value accounting to smooth earnings, I investigate 
whether managers’ discretion on discount rates plays any role in meeting or beating 
forecasts. When securitizations meet the sale’s requirement, the transferor removes all the 
receivables from its records and collects cash from the buyer. When the transferor firm 
retains partial interest in the sold receivables, managers use estimation to fair value the 
future cash flows related to their interests in the securitized assets (Dechow et al. 2010). 
When estimating the fair value of the cash flows of the retained interest, managers might 
use a lower discount rate to show higher fair value and higher gain. Therefore, I use a 
regression model similar to that used by Dechow et al. (2010), with some additional 
variables. 
 To test H2, I use the following multivariable linear regression model separately 





DIS-RATEit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit +   β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3INT-SEC-PREit  
+ β4 LVRGit + β5 SIZEit + β6 LIQUIDITYit + β7 BETAit + β8 ROAit + εi      
                                                                                                                                                                        … (1-2) 
                                                                                   
Where: 
 
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values 
of assets9. 
                                                             





SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from the firm’s 
10K and is scaled by last year’s stockholder equity. 
 PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is 
a proxy for manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are 
collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the SEC. 
INT-SEC-PREit: The interaction variable between securitization gain and earnings before 
securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t. 
Other control variables: 
LVRGit: Total liabilities divided by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets for firm i at the end 
of year t. 
BETAit: A measure of the systematic risk for firm i in year t (collected from 
COMPUSTAT). 
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i at the end of year t (collected from COMPUSTAT). 
Variables used in the equation are as defined above. The significance and negative sign 
of the coefficient of SEC-GAIN supports my second hypothesis (H2).  
IV. RESULTS 
 Table 2-1 presents the descriptive statistics for all U.S. companies used to test the 
hypothesis. The study consists of 71 companies with 355 company-year observations 
from the beginning of 2005 up to the end of 2010, excluding 2007. The extreme financial 




credit crunches, and damaged investors’ confidence, had extraordinary impacts on the 
market, and financial reports did not represent the normal course of business during this 
period. I have divided the data into three time periods to control for the effects of 
economic and financial changes. I use a Logit model with panel data for the first two 
periods (2005-2006 and 2008-2009) and a Logit model with cross-sectional data for the 
third period (2010). Using the residual analysis, all outliers are detected and removed 
from the regression model. In the residual analysis, I ran the original model and 
calculated the residual-squared then plotted the residual-squared against each 
independent variable to find outliers.  
  
Table 2-1 
Descriptive Statistics for Paper One  
(companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach) 
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses)  
Panel A: 2005-2006 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25th %tile Median 75th %tile Min Max 
MEETit 142 0.2535211 0.436567 0 0 1 0 1 
SEC-GAINit 143 0.0096119 0.072749 0 8.45E-07 0.0002409 0.00 0.83 
PRESEC-EARit 142 0.019833 0.171974 -0.0000822 1.60E-06 0.0003064 -0.59739 1.599 
INDU-GAINt 142 9.999261 77.19853 0.0259588 0.2875352 3.299046 -0.5885 920.1 
ADV-CHAN/RIit 142 -0.245455 2.723875 -0.001154 0 0 -32.4408 3E-04 
MKT-VOLit 142 0.0277697 0.038971 0.0034914 0.0156763 0.0367135 0.00 0.236 
DIS-RATEit 130 0.1420754 0.13874 0.1 0.11225 0.1385 0.06 0.98 
SIZEit 126 9.229762 2.565112 7.5475 8.965 10.78 1.97 14.45 









Descriptive Statistics for Paper One (Continued) 
Panel B: 2008-2009 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25th %tile Median 75th %tile Min Max 
MEETit 142 0.542254 0.499975 0 1 1 0 1 
SEC-GAINit 142 0.018526 0.093198 0 0.0002059 0.0102173 0.0000 0.490933 
PRESEC-EARit 142 0.015754 0.449393 -0.0100816 -0.0002268 0.0000568 -1.67161 4.918738 
INDU-GAINt 142 0.691559 1.233717 0.0302982 0.15334 0.6233758 -0.12179 6.185644 
ADV-CHAN/RIit 142 -0.00085 0.017072 -0.001015 -0.0000339 O -0.064 0.183898 
MKT-VOLit 142 0.068028 0.064254 0.0102884 0.0531474 0.0947665 0.0000 0.279185 
DIS-RATEit 136 0.140136 0.134514 0.1 0.11 0.13205 0.06 0.98 
SIZEit 124 9.244106 2.669727 7.290797 8.966519 11.0027 3.619851 14.6145 
SEGit 142 2.669014 1.991905 1 2 4 1 10 
 
Panel c: 2010 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25th %tile Median 75th %tile Min Max 
MEETit 71 0.542254 0.499975 0 1 1 0 1 
SEC-GAINit 71 0.577465 0.497479 0 0.0000136 0.0003102 0.00000 0.170963 
PRESEC-EARit 71 0.006407 0.025225 -0.0000654 0.0000415 0.0605711 -0.17096 0.964404 
INDU-GAINt 71 0.068115 0.186212 0.0025677 0.0289697 0.1151988 -1.93064 3.639035 
ADV-CHAN/RIit 71 0.214401 0.709928 -0.0006022 -1.02E-07 0 -0.16894 0.230888 
MKT-VOLit 71 -0.00049 0.03463 0.0072358 0.0538238 0.0832345 0.00000 0.166453 
DIS-RATEit 67 0.052035 0.043184 0.1 0.1061 0.13 0.0394 0.974 
SIZEit 59 0.137149 0.136754 7.408278 9.15173 11.06695 3.633922 14.63305 
SEGit 71 9.330365 2.721738 1 2 4 1 10 
 
Where:  
MEETit: Is a dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise. 
Earnings surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S). 
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by 
last year’s stockholder equity. 
 PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for 
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-




INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated 
by the stockholders’ equity.  
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of year t used as a 
proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in expected future cash flows of 
financial assets. 
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk. 
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets10. 
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t. 
  
 
 Table 2-2 contains the results from the Pearson correlation matrices. Any variable 
with a strong correlation to other variables has been eliminated from my models. The 
three panels of Table 2-2 represent the for each time period. As shown in the tables, there 
are some significant correlations (indicated by * as marginally significant or p-value 
between 0.05 and 0.1, ** as significant or p-value between .01 and 0.05, and *** as 
highly significant or p-value less than 0.01) among variables; however, none of the 
correlations show any sign of multicollinearity. The common rule of thumb for 
identifying multicollinearity is a variance inflation factor (VIF) of 10 or more, or 
tolerance of 0.1 or less. Another way is to examine the bivariate correlations between 
independent variables and look for a correlation of 0.7 or higher. Lastly, muticollinearity 
may be present when the overall model is significant but none of the independent 
variables are significant. After dropping variables that show a high bivariate correlation, 




                                                             






Correlation Matrices for Paper One 
 (companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach) 
 
Panel A: 2005-2006 
  SEC-GAINit PRESEC-EARit INDU-GAINt ADV-CHAN/RIit MKT-VOLit DIS-RATEit SIZEit 
SEC-GAINit 1             
PRESEC-EARit -0.2478*** 1           
INDU-GAINt 0.0024 0.1229 1         
ADV-CHAN/RIit 0.114 -0.045 -0.0177 1       
MKT-VOLit -0.0396 0.0425 -0.0024 -0.0072 1     
DIS-RATEit 0.0288 -0.033 -0.0191 -0.0128 0.0033 1   
SIZEit 0.0667 0.0807 0.1747* 0.1641* -0.2565*** 0.0243 1 
SEGit 0.2734*** -0.022 0.0679 -0.0249 0.1595* -0.116 0.2137** 
 
Panel B: 2008-2009 
  SEC-GAINit PRESEC-EARit INDU-GAINt ADV-CHAN/RIit MKT-VOLit DIS-RATEit SIZEit 
SEC-GAINit 1             
PRESEC-EARit 0.0289 1           
INDU-GAINt 0.1161 0.0412 1         
ADV-CHAN/RIit -0.0345 -0.2424*** 0.0975 1       
MKT-VOLit 0.061 -0.0722 -0.0743 -0.094 1     
DIS-RATEit 0.0067 -0.0223 0.0673 0.019 -0.0522 1   
SIZEit 0.0958 -0.0029 0.0394 -0.1414 0.3079*** -0.085 1 
SEGit -0.0298 -0.0692 -0.0884 0.0987 0.2484*** -0.056 0.1803** 
 
Panel C: 2010 
  SEC-GAINit PRESEC-EARit INDU-GAINt ADV-CHAN/RIit MKT-VOLit DIS-RATEit SIZEit 
SEC-GAINit 1             
PRESEC-EARit -0.2161* 1           
INDU-GAINt 0.1087 0.3848*** 1         
ADV-CHAN/RIit 0.4344*** -0.1817 -0.0763 1       
MKT-VOLit -0.0814 -0.0294 0.0995 -0.1637 1     
DIS-RATEit -0.0149 0.0142 -0.0005 -0.4119*** -0.0336 1   
SIZEit 0.0039 0.2301* 0.1507 0.0762 0.0804 -0.16 1 










SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and it is scaled 
by last year’s stockholder equity. 
 PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for 
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-
Ks filed with the SEC. 
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated 
by the stockholders’ equity.  
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of year t used as a 
proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in expected future cash flows of 
financial assets. 
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk. 
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets11. 
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t. 
 
 
Table 2-3 contains the result of three Logit models. This table shows a significant 
positive association between SEC-GAIN and meeting/beating analyst forecasts only for 
the 2005-2006 period. This result supports my hypotheses and is consistent with the 
findings by Dechow et al. (2010). However, I did not find any indication of earnings 
management for the other two periods because the coefficient of SEC-GAIN is not 
significant at any acceptably meaningful level. My analysis shows that mortgage 
companies and other financial institutions during 2005-2006 were doing extremely well 
by generating and selling loans. During this period, many people weren’t familiar with 
the securitization process. However, the fall of large banks and financial institutions was 
a wake-up call to investors. Consequently, I speculate that managers became more 
conservative during the 2008-2009 period. The result for the 2010 period suggests that 
                                                             





the new revision to SFAS 140, SFAS 166, which changed the criteria for securitization 
accounting, has been effective.  
 
Table 2-3 
 Regression Results for Paper One  
(companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach) 
 
P (MEETit) = f ( β0 + β1SEC-GAINit +   β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3IND-GAINt+ β4 ADV-
CHAN/RTit + β5 MKT-VOLit + β6DIS-RATEit + β7 SIZEit + β8 SEGit )     … (1-1) 
 2005-2006 2008-2009 2010 














SEC-GAINit 1.5553*** 2.48 0.013 -0.1126063 -0.18 0.854 -3.32317 -0.88 0.381 
PRESEC-EARit 0.2200965 0.46 0.642 0.616486 1.34 0.181 0.606789 1.49 0.142 
INDU-GAINt -0.000414 -0.06 0.951 -0.0055166 -0.11 0.912 0.007691 0.07 0.948 
ADV-CHAN/RIit 0.0009092 0.06 0.951 2.223908 0.17 0.869 0.208303 0.05 0.964 
MKT-VOLit -0.4942993 -0.43 0.667 0.2205576 0.27 0.783 3.254642* 1.85 0.071 
DIS-RATEit 0.5097591* 1.79 0.073 -0.1521506 -0.47 0.638 0.638787 0.93 0.356 
SIZEit 0.0086485 0.47 0.638 0.0456265** 2.14 0.033 0.013958 0.49 0.624 
SEGit -0.0291212 -1.31 0.189 -0.0396732 -1.62 0.104 -0.03824 -1.23 0.226 
_cons 0.1836335 0.99 0.323 0.272108 1.38 0.167 0.30561 1.06 0.294 
 
         
Adj. r-squared: 0.1277**   0.0980   0.0532   
(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***) 
 
Where:  
MEETit: A dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise. 
Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings forecasts 
for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S). 
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by 
last year’s stockholder equity. 
 PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for 
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-
Ks filed with the SEC. 
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated 
by the stockholders’ equity.  
ADV-CHAN/RI it: Adverse change divided by retained interest for firm i at the end of year t used as a 
proxy for risk. Adverse change is a measure of volatility in expected future cash flows of 
financial assets. 




DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets12. 
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
SEG it: Number of operating segments for firm i at the end of year t. 
 
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that managers use a discount rate as a tool to manage 
earnings when the company retains partial interest in a securitized asset. Since managers 
need to use assumptions in calculating the fair value of expected cash flows from the 
retained portion, they have some discretion in choosing a suitable discount rate in their 
calculations. From the first regression, I found evidence of earnings management using 
securitization only during the first period (2005-2006); therefore, I next ran a multivariate 
regression on data from 2005-2006 to test whether a discount rate was used for earnings 
management. The fair value of the retained interest is calculated as the present value of 
the stream of the future cash inflows. The higher the discount rate, the lower the fair 
value will be, and vice versa. Prior research concludes that a discount rate is used to 
manipulate the fair value of the asset. That is, prior research found a negative association 
between securitization gain and discount rate so, consistent with prior studies, I expected 
the sign of a discount rate to be significant and negative.   
Table 2-4 shows the results of a multivariate regression using panel data that tests 
the association between discount rate and securitization. The result shows no any 
association between a securitization gain and discount rate, which does not support my 
hypothesis and is not consistent with findings by Dechow et al. (2010). 
 
                                                             






 Regression Results for Discount Rate as Dependent Variable  
(for companies following U.S. GAAP – Control based approach) 
 
DIS-RATEit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit +   β2 PRESEC-EARit + β3INT-SEC-PREit + β4LVRGit + β5SIZEit  
+ β6LIQUIDITYit + β7BETAit + β8ROAit + εi 
 
DIS-RATEit Coef. z P>|z| 
SEC-GAINit -0.03643 -0.26 0.791 
PRESEC-EARit 0.001803 0.05 0.963 
INT-SEC-PREit -0.31183 -0.53 0.595 
LVRGit  0.001019 0.04 0.971 
SIZEit 0.005396 0.79 0.431 
LIQUIDITYit 0.014814 0.23 0.818 
BETAit -0.00063 -0.14 0.889 
ROAit 9.74E-06 0.1 0.916 
_cons 0.093883 1.3 0.192 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0415   
(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***) 
   
Where:  
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets13. 
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by 
last year’s stockholder equity. 
 PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t (also is a proxy for 
manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-
Ks filed with the SEC. 
INT-SEC-PREit: The interaction variable between securitization gain and earnings before securitization 
gain for firm i at the end of year t. 
LVRGit: Total liabilities divided by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
SZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LIQUIDITYit:  Total cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets for firm i at the end of year t.  
BETAit: A measure of the systematic risk for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT). 
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i at the end of year t (collected from COMPUSTAT). 
 
 
My results show the existence of earnings management under U.S. GAAP during 
2005-2006, the period before the financial crisis, so I next examine whether there is any 
association between securitization gain and meeting/beating earnings forecast for 
                                                             





companies following IFRS. Tables 2-5 and 2-6 (each consists of data for three different 
periods) present the descriptive statistic and correlation matrices for firms following 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Definitions of data are the same as 
those provided earlier in this dissertation for companies following U.S. GAAP. As I 
mentioned earlier, using the residual analysis, all outliers are detected and removed from 
the regression model. In the residual analysis, I ran the original model and calculated the 
residual-squared, then plotted the residual-squared against each independent variable to 
find outliers. As I also described earlier, after dropping variables that show high bivariate 
correlation, my analysis does not suffer from any of the multicollinearity symptoms.   
 
Table 2-5 
Descriptive Statistics for Paper One (for companies following IFRS - Risk based approach) 
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses) 
 
Panel A: 2005-2006 






75th %tile Min Max 
MEETit 80 0.5375 0.501738 0 1 1 0 1 
SEC-GAINit 74 0.022002 0.106325 0 0.0019531 0.0128746 0.00000 0.910598 
IND-GAINt 74 -14.2838 47.5746 -7.789807 -0.5931541 -0.0572534 -303.686 4.366204 
MKT-VOLit 66 0.048073 0.039585 0.0242425 0.04053 0.065125 0.00051 0.26875 
DISRATEit 64 0.107488 0.03375 0.08925 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.16 
SIZEit 74 18.20715 3.317118 15.32291 18.73759 20.02763 12.50103 26.1 
LVRGit 74 0.777839 0.298365 0.6806379 0.9347776 0.9573288 0.00000 0.993505 
LIQUIDITYit 74 0.048623 0.069203 0.0060965 0.0212892 0.0621536 0.000593 0.282788 













Descriptive Statistics for Paper One (Continued) 
Panel B: 2008-2009 






75th %tile Min Max 
MEETit 80 0.3625 0.483755 0 0 1 0 1 
SEC-GAINit 78 0.030455 0.179768 
0 0.000206 0.0179769 0.00000 0.551792 
IND-GAINt 78 -18.5787 46.30486 -11.3191 -1.150923 -0.0784411 -245.624 24.55209 
MKT-VOLit 64 0.10723 0.075354 0.044645 0.09527 0.1592425 0.00068 0.31341 
DISRATEit 73 0.107658 0.035969 0.088 0.11 0.13 0.025 0.18 
SIZEit 78 18.65359 3.283764 16.70366 19.36101 20.29982 12.16645 26.4 
LVRGit 78 18.65359 3.283764 0.8001556 0.9369088 0.9534939 12.16645 26.4 
LIQUIDITYit 78 0.00013 0.019413 
0.0108583 0.0320459 0.0604727 -0.07974 0.07085 
ROEit 78 0.046706 0.050908 -0.0225 0.055 0.13 9.39E-05 0.24 
 
Panel C: 2010 
Variable  Obs Mean    Std. Dev. 
25th %tile Median 75th %tile 
Min Max 
MEETit 39 0.48718 0.50637 0 0 1 0 1 
SEC-GAINit 38 0.018478 0.140588 0 0.0005991 0.0145284 0.00000 0.443686 
IND-GAINt 38 10.7467 23.19061 0.0616094 0.9218992 11.57394 -5.23691 98.50879 
MKT-VOLit 32 0.077935 0.051869 0.03444 0.074205 0.110185 0.00016 0.23027 
DISRATEit 37 0.105622 0.033862 0.089 0.11 0.1295 0.025 0.164 
SIZEit 38 18.67024 3.353848 
16.52661 19.17263 20.81655 12.23658 26.4 
LVRGit 38 0.815693 0.252192 
0.8068669 0.9330751 0.9540754 0.002057 0.99725 
LIQUIDITYit 38 0.044301 0.047555 
0.0145737 0.0342155 0.0642847 0.000417 0.251354 
ROEit 38 1.884737 12.72118 0.0275 0.07 0.1325 -5.68 77.98 
 
Where:  
MEETit: A dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise. 
Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings forecasts 
for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S). 
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and it is scaled 
by last year’s stockholder equity. 
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated 
by the stockholders’ equity.  
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk. 
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets14. 
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
ROEit: Return on equity for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT). 
                                                             






 Correlation Matrices for Paper One (for companies following IFRS - Risk based approach) 
Panel A: 2005-2006 
  SEC-GAINit IND-GAINt MKT-VOLit DISRATEit SIZEit LVRGit LIQUILIDYit 
SEC-GAINit 1             
IND-GAINt 0.0455 1           
MKT-VOLit 0.1754 -0.067 1         
DISRATEit -0.1788 -0.2105 0.071 1       
SIZEit -0.085 0.3746*** -0.0308 -0.0344 1     
LVRGit -0.2633** -0.0508 -0.058 0.0096 0.3267*** 1   
LIQUILIDYit 0.0207 -0.0447 0.0119 0.0264 -0.3172*** -0.2443** 1 
ROEit -0.0179 0.0124 0.0339 0.2734** -0.0244 0.1172 0.3905*** 
Panel B: 2008-2009 
  SEC-GAINit IND-GAINt MKT-VOLit DISRATEit SIZEit LVRGit LIQUILIDYit 
SEC-GAINit 1             
IND-GAINt -0.0783 1           
MKT-VOLit -0.0194 -0.1338 1         
DISRATEit 0.2783** 0.0136 0.0957 1       
SIZEit -0.1014 0.4713*** -0.1036 -0.009 1     
LVRGit -0.222* 0.3126*** 0.1304 -0.0089 0.4181*** 1   
LIQUILIDYit 0.0342 -0.218 -0.0616 -0.014 -0.0795 -0.2005* 1 
ROEit -0.0221 0.0657 -0.1462 0.305***7 -0.0659 0.1048 -0.127 
Panel C: 2010 
  SEC-GAINit IND-GAINt MKT-VOLit DISRATEit SIZEit LVRGit LIQUILIDYit 
SEC-GAINit 1             
IND-GAINt 0.2352 1           
MKT-VOLit 0.2816 -0.0494 1         
DISRATEit 0.2177 0.0098 0.1158 1       
SIZEit 0.044 -0.3817** 0.2921 -0.0683 1     
LVRGit 0.1464 -0.2039 0.0693 -0.0475 0.446*** 1   
LIQUILIDYit -0.0903 -0.0445 -0.0666 -0.1369 -0.1081 -0.3182* 1 




SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by 
last year’s stockholder equity. 
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated 
by the stockholders’ equity.  




DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets15. 
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LVRG it: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
ROE it: Return on equity for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT). 
 
 
Table 2-7 shows the results of three models that test the relationship between 
securitization gain and meeting/beating forecast over three timeframes (2005-2006, 2008-
2009, 2010) for companies following IFRS. As the results show, there is no association 
between dependent variables and securitization gain. Thus, I cannot support the 
hypothesis for companies that follow IFRS because I have not found any evidence of 
earnings management. Therefore, my prediction is supported, suggesting that IFRS 
criteria for securitization are harder to meet, so the opportunity for earnings management 




















                                                             






 Regression Results for Paper One (for companies following IFRS - Risk based approach) 
 
P (MEETit) = f ( β0 + β1SEC-GAINit +   β2 IND-GAINt+ β3 MKT-VOLit + β4DIS-RATEit  
+ Β5SIZEit + β6LVRGit + β7LIQUIDITYit +β8 ROEit ) 
 
















SEC-GAINit -0.06146 -0.15 0.882 0.5745409 1.34 0.181 0.6169389 1.42 0.163 
INDU-GAINt -0.00132 -0.65 0.512 0.0018842 0.72 0.474 0.002392 0.93 0.358 
MKT-VOLit -1.4978 -1.08 0.279 1.762245* 1.86 0.063 1.793045 1.86 0.069 
DIS-RATEit 4.26615 1.5 0.134 0.1583458 0.08 0.937 -0.5050987 -0.22 0.823 
SIZEit 0.001483 0.04 0.97 -0.0195633 -0.6 0.55 -0.0250704 -0.79 0.434 
LVRGit -0.2587 -0.81 0.418 0.0053445 0.02 0.984 -0.0596433 -0.23 0.821 
LIQUIDITYit -1.27417 -0.87 0.386 -0.7735758 -0.57 0.569 -0.6754125 -0.5 0.617 
ROEit 0.016694 0.71 0.48 0.0048943 0.73 0.463 0.0052923 0.81 0.421 
_cons 0.336406 0.39 0.7 0.5798773 0.87 0.385 0.6678149 0.92 0.365 
 
         
Adj. r-squared: 0.2863   0.2249   0.0437   
 (Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***) 
  
Where:  
MEETit: A dummy variable equal to one when earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise. 
Earning surprise is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ earnings forecasts 
for firm i in year t (Collected from I/B/E/S). 
SEC-GAINit: Securitization gain for firm i at the end of year t is collected from firm’s 10K and is scaled by 
last year’s stockholder equity. 
INDU-GAINt : Average securitization gain of companies in the same industry at the end of year t deflated 
by the stockholders’ equity.  
MKT-VOL it: Market volatility for firm i at the end of year t as a proxy for risk. 
DIS- RATE it: Discount rate for firm i at the end of year t used in estimation of fair values of assets16. 
SIZE it: Natural log of total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LVRG it: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets for firm i at the end of year t. 
ROE it: Return on equity for firm i in year t (collected from COMPUSTAT). 
 
 
                                                             






The criteria for securitization differ under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. SFAS 140 
(revised by SFAS statement 166 in 2009) is criticized for having easier criteria than IAS 
39 set by IFRS. Dechow et al. (2010) used a sample of U.S. firms for the period before 
2005 and find evidence of earnings management through securitization.  
In this dissertation, I first used all U.S. companies that are engaged in 
securitization transactions and test the possibility of earnings management using 
securitization. I examine all companies that have completed data for three time periods to 
capture changes in the economy and regulations. I find evidence of earnings management 
for the period 2005-2006 (before the financial crisis) for companies following U.S. 
GAAP. I have found support for one of my hypotheses only; however, my results do not 
support the discount-rate hypothesis. That is, my findings show that the discount rate is 
not used for manipulating fair value of retained interest.  The possible explanation for the 
observed positive association between meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts and 
securitization gain during 2005-2006 is that, as studies show under SFAS No. 140, the 
conditions for sales-accounting securitization was easily met and managers were able to 
manage earnings. However, I have not found the same results for 2008-2009 because 
during this period, companies were under a lot of scrutiny as they faced financial 
difficulties. Under this condition, the opportunity for securitization was low, and 
managers became more conservative. For companies following IFRS, as I expected, the 
results do not show any evidence of earnings management because the criteria to meet 




U.S. GAAP during the second and third period (2008-2009, 2010). It appears that since 
the economic crisis of 2007, managers are under more scrutiny and investigation. In other 
words, the opportunity cost of earnings management has become extremely high, and that 
is why the occurrence of earnings management has declined during the last few years.  
In summary, the results indicate that Statement 166 has reduced the differences 
between the GAAP and the IFRS in regard to securitization activities17. This is an 









                                                             
17 In order to reduce the differences between accounting standards set by FASB and ISBA in 
regard to financial assets and securitizations activities, FASB, in June of 2009, published 
statement no. 166, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets, which was a revision to 
Statement no. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities. This new standard requires more disclosures on transfer of 
financial assets, specifically when firms retain partial interest in the transferred assets, which 
consequently exposes the firm to risk. The new regulation has also set new criteria for de-
recognizing financial assets. Under this statement, “qualifying special-purpose entity” is 
eliminated.  The Financial statements prepared from the beginning of 2010 should reflect the 
impact of the new standard. The new standard influences my papers as well; therefore, I 
expanded my data from 2005 to 2010 to show the impact of differences in accounting standards 





PAPER TWO: SECURITIZATION GAIN, COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I examine whether gain from securitization is the product of 
earnings management or the result of a firm’s competitive advantage. Companies sell or 
securitize assets to gain several benefits, such as generating capital, transferring risks to a 
third party, and improving financial ratios. Securitization can generate gain for several 
reasons which I am investigating in this paper using all companies that follow the U.S. 
GAAP.  
Prior studies provide evidence that managers use accounting for valuation of 
retained interest in securitized assets to record gain (Bartov 1993; Karaoglu 2005; 
Dechow et al. 2010).  Retained interest is the portion of the receivables that the company 
is holding and has not yet sold. However, Barth and Taylor (2010, BT hereafter) argue 
that a positive income from securitization could be realized because the company has a 
competitive advantage in originating financial assets and selling them at a profit. 
Therefore, BT suggests that this gain is not necessarily the consequence of earnings 
management. BT also suggests that a gain can be realized from cherry-picking, which 
means that for the purpose of securitization, managers select assets that have appreciated 
most in their values as compared to their historical costs. Karaoglu (2005) finds evidence 




 Dechow et al. (2010) investigates securitization and earnings smoothing using 
flexibility in fair-value accounting for estimating the retained interest in securitized asset 
for a sample of American companies. Karaoglu (2005) investigates loan sales and loan 
transfer (securitization) and earnings management for a sample of American banks. In my 
second paper, consistent with BT’s proposition, I investigate whether the companies that 
follow U.S. GAAP and securitize assets realize gain because of their competitive 
advantage in creating loans and financial assets or because of management discretion. 
Existing studies have focused most on securitization and earnings management by 
companies or banks which follow the U.S. GAAP; however, I expand my study to 
examine the possible determinants (earnings management vs. competitive advantage) for 
the reported gain from securitization.  
Asset securitization has significantly changed the field of finance. It improves 
liquidity for financial institutions, helps in utilizing capital at its highest level, and opens 
more opportunities for investment. Nevertheless, securitization is a complex process and 
involves accounting approaches such as fair-value accounting, which is very 
controversial (Wallison 2008a & 2008b; Whalen 2008; Forbes 2009;Gaschler 2010; 
Skeel 2011). Fair-value accounting is a method of accounting which requires or allows 
the users to report assets and liabilities at their market values when preparing financial 
statements. However, fair-value accounting rules are complex, flexible, and subject to 
user’s discretion when estimating the value of financial instruments. Since asset 
securitization has become very important in the financial market, it is important for 




the way firms use this method for generating capital. The result of this section should 
help investors in figuring out whether a firm’s reported securitization gain is a sign of 
competitive advantage or of managers’ opportunistic acts.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  First, I offer background and 
explanation on some important issues, and then I continue with hypothesis development, 
data collection, empirical tests, results, and conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
  In this section, I provide information about key components of this study, 
including securitization, fair-value accounting, earnings management, and competitive 
advantage. I also develop the hypotheses of this study.  
Securitization 
Securitization is a method of generating cash through which sellers of assets can 
transfer part of ownership’s risks and benefits to a third party who is willing or able to 
assume the risks. In this process, the interest in a pool of assets is sold to a special-
purpose entity. Adhikari and Betancourt (2008) simply define securitization as “a tool for 
financing a pool of assets.” 
Before the 1970s, when securitization first started, banks were basically portfolio 
lenders, and they would hold onto loans until the loans were paid off. Since the1970s, 
securitization has become very common, and companies (financial and non-financial) use 
the new approach of pooling together receivables, loans, and other financial assets, and 




As shown in Figure 1 and discussed earlier, in a simple  securitization process, the 
selling firm (the transferor of assets) transfers the ownership of a pool of assets to a 
special-purpose entity (SPE), which is usually owned by the transferor firm and can be a 
trust or corporation. Next, the SPE issues securities backed by the interest in the expected 
cash flows from the pooled assets, and transfers proceeds from the sale of securities to the 
transferor of assets. A servicing company, usually the transferor firm, collects the cash 
flows over the life of the assets and passes it to investors through the special-purpose 
entity. 
Investors are usually risk-averse; therefore, the securitization transaction is 
structured in such a way that the transferred assets are separated from transferor’s other 
assets in order to limit the investors’ risk should the transferor faces financial problems. 
The limitation in risk increases the investors’ demand for securitized assets. As a result, 
firms are able to raise capital with lower costs than in conventional borrowing. 
Securitization can benefit the seller in different ways and, because of its benefits, it has 
become so important that in the United States alone, more than fifty percent of debt 
issued in 2003 was securitized assets1. During the same period, European countries 
increased their securitization by about 38 percent2 over the previous year. A single, 1.6 
billion-dollar-securitization transaction by a Chinese firm in 2003 also shows that 
securitization has become a worldwide financial activity.  
                                                             
1 Source: Bond Market Association (2004) 




 Table 3-1 is a summary of the parties involved in securitization, and the possible 
benefits and risks affecting each party.    
 
Table 3-1 
Parties, Benefits, and Risks Involved in Securitization 
 
Parties Involved Benefits Risks involved in securitization 
process 
Originators of  loans Increase the return on capital 
-  Lower borrowing costs 
-  Create additional capital 
-  Better asset/liability 
management 
 
Originator of assets can be in risk 
when facing financial difficulties. 
As a result, their creditors can go 
after the company’s sold assets. 
Investors Securitized assets offers 
-  Better yields 
-  Increase market liquidity 
-  Better protection  
-  Flexible payment stream which 
best suits the   investors  
 
Moral Hazard: 
Management can cherry-pick the 




The complexity of accounting for 
securitization reduces the 
transparency; therefore, this 
makes the prediction and analysis 




Valuation of securities for which 
market value is not available. 
 
Borrowers Increase availability of credits  
 
 
Securitization can be structured as secured borrowing or as a sales transaction. 
Managers prefer the sales transaction because it allows them to eliminate the sold assets 
from their balance sheet and recognize a gain/loss which is equal to the difference 
between the book value and sale price of the assets. However, in the case of secured 




by the amount of cash received for the assets. The problem with secured borrowing is the 
increase in the firm’s leverage, which is not desirable. Niu and Richardson (2006) show 
that the leverage ratio of a sample of American firms would have been significantly 
higher if the transferors had accounted their sale of assets as secured borrowing. 
Nevertheless, the accounting for securitization is not simple, and it becomes more 
complicated when it is not clear whether transaction is treated as a secured borrowing or 
a sales transaction.  
Both types of securitization (secured borrowing and sale) have great impact on 
financial statements. Firms can sell any asset that generates cash flow, from the most 
common one, which is trade receivables, to other kinds of assets, such as automobile and 
mortgage loans, and receivables from credit cards.  
Fair-Value Accounting  
 Fair-value accounting basically means reporting assets and liabilities at their fair 
values. Determining the market price of some assets is difficult, specifically when a 
country is going through economic and financial crises, and the market value of some 
assets are not available. As a result, the fair value of assets has to be subjectively 
estimated. Therefore, critics blame fair-value accounting for the recent financial crisis. 
They argue that in these situations, models based on subjective estimation are used for 
assessing the fair value of assets whose active market prices are not available (Laux and 
Leuz 2009). Byrne et al. (2008) find evidence that managers implement fair-value 
accounting with different levels of conservatism. Other studies also show that 




estimation errors (Barth and Landsman 1995). Fiechter and Meyer (2009) use a sample of 
552 U.S. companies and investigate the association between measurement of fair-value 
accounting and earnings management. They find that managers in their sample firms use 
the complexity of fair-value measurement for managing earnings. Another study by Ryan 
(2008) also provides evidence showing that when market prices for some liquid assets are 
not available, estimation of fair value can be open to earnings manipulation.      
 Earnings Management 
Prior studies show many reasons for managers to manage earnings. Income 
smoothing (Bartov 1993; Graham et al 2005), components of compensation (Shrieves and 
Gao 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Shuto 2007), the IPO process (Teoh et al. 
1998; Li et al. 2006), loan covenant (Bartov 1993; El-Mahdy 2010), and beating or 
meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts (Athanasakou et al. 2009; Abarbanell and Lehavy 
2003) are some factors which motivate discretionary decisions. However, factors which 
encourage earnings management are not the focus of this paper, and my goal is to show 
that managers use fair-value accounting estimation of retained interest in securitized 
assets to show gains in order to meet analysts’ forecasts.   
Historical cost accounting requires assets to be recognized at their acquisition 
costs when purchased, and any appreciation in the value of asset is not recognized unless 
the ownership of the asset is transferred to another party. When a firm sells assets, 
managers can take advantage of historical accounting rules to record the gain in two 
ways. Managers can cherry-pick those assets with the greatest difference between their 




desirable gains by taking advantage of the flexibility entangled with the fair-value 
accounting estimation of retained interests in the securitized assets (Dechow et al. 2010).  
Consolidation and de-recognition are the two issues essential to accounting for 
securitizations, of which the latter is related to our study. When the securitized asset is 
removed from transferor’s books, and the transferor’s involvement in the asset is stopped, 
the accounting and de-recognition is simple. However, accounting for securitization 
becomes complicated when the transferor stays involved with the sold assets “either in 
the form of servicing, recourse, or retention of some of the cash flows” (Adhikari and 
Betancourt 2008, 77).  
In situations where the transferor keeps partial interest in the pooled assets, and 
the market value of the retained portion of assets is not available, the fair-market value of 
the retained interest has to be estimated. This estimation is usually based on private 
information and the discretion of managers.     
Competitive Advantage 
Porter (1985) was the first to promote low-cost or differentiation strategies as a 
way for firms to achieve competitive advantage. Barney (1996) defines competitive 
advantage as a strategy which creates value and is dominated by one firm, where 
competitors cannot imitate the strategy easily. Firms can achieve competitive advantage 
through a well-designed strategy (e.g. differentiation) or through the possession of 
rare/unique resources. Using either method, firms can improve performance and offer 




that firms can gain competitive advantage by jointly using their distinguished skills and 
rare resources.   
As mentioned before, studies showed evidence of earnings management using 
fair-value accounting through securitization. Barth and Taylor (2010) defend fair-value 
accounting by arguing that securitization gain could be the result of companies’ 
competitive advantage over unique resources or activities. In this dissertation, I control 
for the companies’ competitive advantage and examine the earnings management in 
relation to securitization. Therefore, I control for components of firms’ competitive 
advantage and investigate the claim made by Dechow et al., which states that managers 
use fair-value accounting rules to manage earnings. Thus I hypothesize:  
H1: For companies that follow U.S. GAAP (risk-based approach), there is a positive 
association between securitization gain and meeting or beating financial analysts’ 
forecasts after controlling for the components of competitive advantage. 
 
III. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This section discusses the data collection and methodology used in this study. 
Data Collection  
I used LexisNexis and several keywords to find companies in the U.S. that used 
securitization transactions during the periods 2005 -2006 and 2008-2010, and have 
almost all of the related data. I have come up with a total of 355 company-year 
observations for 71 companies that follow the U.S. GAAP.  Dechow et al. (2010) made a 
similar study in the period between 2000 and 2005 and collected a total of 96 companies. 
Given that the size of securitization activities has declined significantly since the 2000-




securitization activities and not on my list is extremely low. I use “securitisation”, 
“securitization”, “financial asset”, “receivable” and many more key terms to find 
companies with securitization activities. I went through companies’ annual financial 
reports (10-K) and hand-collected the securitization data. LexisNexis and Google Finance 
were extremely helpful in finding companies’ financial reports, stock information, email 
addresses, and phone numbers. In addition, I used : a) the Research Insights 
(COMPUSTAT) database to collect the financial data, b) The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database to collect monthly stock returns and stock prices, c) the 
SEC’s Edgar database to look at companies’ 10-K reports, d) the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to collect analysts’ earnings and return forecasts, and e) Lexis-
Nexis and other online sources.  
Methodology 
Shareholders of companies with competitive advantage in their fields enjoy higher 
benefits and values, which should increase their return on capital more than their cost of 
capital. Consequently, following Gjerde et al. (2010), from here on GKS, I use the 
following equation to calculate competitive advantage: 
 
CA = ir – k                                                                                         … (2-1) 
 
Where: 
 CA is competitive advantage, ir is the internal rate of return on invested capital, and k is 
the corresponding cost of capital. 
Companies with positive CA (return on capital is higher than risk-adjusted cost of 




creating more value.  GKS take their calculations one step further to examine whether a 
company’s source of competitive advantage is industry-based or resource-based.  
Therefore, they modify equation (1) as follows: 
 




CAIB = (irIt - kIt) represents the industry-based competitive advantage, and is the difference 
between the industry’s average return on capital, irIt and the industry’s average cost of 
capital. A positive CAIB   indicates that the industry is earning an average return higher 
than its average cost of capital. The industry’s competitive advantage results from a 
superior advantage, such as barriers to entry.  
CA RB = ( irit - irIt ) + ( kIt  - kit ) represents the resource-based competitive 
advantage. It is the sum of RED RB = ( irit - irIt ), the difference between the firm’s return 
and the industry’s average return, and the resource-based competitive advantage: RID RB 
= ( kIt  - kit ), the difference between the industry average cost of capital and the firm’s 
cost of capital. A positive RED RB shows that, on average, the company is making higher 
returns than the industry, which could be a result of unique resources or a unique ability 
specific to that company. For example, a company may be able to generate loans better 
than its rivals in the industry. GKF view this variable as a risk-based advantage and 




separated from return3. Following GKF, I use the annual accounting return on equity as a 
proxy for ir, which is the earnings divided by the book value of the stockholders’ equity.  
Cost of Capital 
In prior studies, many methods were used to estimate the cost of capital. Scholars 
have criticized the cost-of-capital models for not providing firm-specific estimates, and 
also for the lack of empirical validity (Easton 2006). Jain (2005) uses eight different 
models to investigate the association between the cost of capital and electronic trading 
and finds different results. In another study, Dhaliwal et al. (2006) use accounting-based 
models to estimate the cost of capital. They examine the impact of corporate and personal 
tax on the association between the cost of capital and a company’s leverage. Easton and 
Monahan (2005) use seven accounting-based models to estimate the cost of capital and 
test the validity of these models. Their results show that none of the estimated cost-of-
capital models is reliable.  
Nevertheless, even though all cost-of-capital models are criticized, they are 
widely used in practice and in empirical research. Therefore, for estimating the cost of 
capital, k, I adopt the following model from Easton et al. (2002), which is a variation of 
the residual income valuation model.  
 
                                                             













                                           … (2-3) 
 
Where: 
Pit  : Price per share 
 bpsit : Book value per share 
ROEit+1  : Return on equity (4 year expected cumulative dividend earnings per share after 
date t) 
git : Growth rate (expected rate of growth in residual income) 
kit  : Expected cost of capital  
I have used the following model to test my hypothesis for different time periods, 
running the model three times - once for the period before the financial crisis (2005-
2006), once for the period after the crisis (2008-2009), and lastly, once for 2010, in which 
the new Standard regarding securitization was issued4. The positive sign of the 
coefficient of MEET supports my hypothesis. 
 
SEC-GAINit = β0 + β1MEETit +   β2 CAIB, it+ β3REDRB, jt + β4RIDRB, jt + β5PRESEC-EARjt 




SEC-GAINit: The gain from securitization obtained from companies’ 10-K filing with the 
SEC for firm i in year t.  
                                                             




MEETit: Equal to one when there is a non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.5 
CAIB, it = (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.  
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): The difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s 
average return. 
RID RB, it = ( kIt  - kit ): The difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and 
the firm’s cost of capital. 
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy 
for manager incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected 
from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the SEC. 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.  
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.  
BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.  
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.  
IV. RESULTS 
 Table 3-2 represents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in regression 
analysis. The three panels of this table contain the information for the three periods used 
in the study (2005-2006, 2008-2009, 2010). I have divided my study into three periods to 
better capture the effects of changes in the economy and market. I consider 2007 to be the 
main period of crisis. The first period (2005-2006) covers the period before financial 
crisis, the second period (2008-2009) reflects the period after the financial crisis, and 
                                                             





finally the last period (2010) should show the impact of the new regulation for 
securitization. My study consists of 71 companies from 5 different industries with a total 
of 355 company-year observations. Securitization gains, pre-securitization earnings, and 
industry securitization gains are scaled by prior-year equity. Other control variables, such 
as liquidity and capital expenditures, are scaled by total assets. Using residual analysis, 
all outliers are detected and removed from the regression model. In the residual analysis, 
I ran the original model and calculated the residual-squared, then plotted the residual-




Descriptive Statistics for Paper Two (companies following U.S. GAAP) 
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses) 
 
Panel A: 2005-2006 
Variable Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. 25th %tile Median 75th %tile Min. Max. 
SEC-GAIN it 142 0.009612 0.073007 0 8.45E-07 0.00024 0.12204 0.830171 
MEET it 142 0.253521 0.436567 0 0 1 0 1 
CAIB, it 130 6.683923 2.047742 6.14 6.22 6.59 1.53 11.9 
REDRB, it 130 -0.10554 12.76548 -4.0975 -1.01 2.9975 -63.58 69.43 
RIDRB, it 130 7.69E-05 3.261971 -2.04 0.08 1.955 -14.02 7.31 
PRESEC-EAR it 142 0.019833 0.171974 -0.0000822 1.60E-06 0.000306 -0.59739 1.599352 
SIZE it 126 9.229762 2.565112 7.5475 8.965 10.78 1.97 14.45 
BETA it 103 0.881825 0.810627 0.409 0.821 1.372 -4.175 2.82 















Descriptive Statistics for Paper Two (Continued) 
Panel B: 2008-2009 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. 25th %tile Median 75th %tile Min. Max. 
SEC-GAIN it 142 0.018526 0.093198 0 0.0002059 0.0102173 0.0000 0.490933 
MEET it 142 0.542254 0.499975 0 1 1 0 1 
CAIB, it 130 2.808385 7.73002 -3.01 -2.13 6.06 -3.01 20.66 
REDRB,it 130 0.001923 18.62295 -6.38 -0.45 7.095 -79.84 77.46 
RIDRB, it 130 -0.00077 3.911702 -2.22 0.5 2.7225 -15.85 7.24 
PRESEC-EAR 





SIZEitit 124 9.244106 2.669727 7.290797 8.966519 11.0027 3.619851 14.6145 
BETA it 126 1.543659 2.602721 0.647 1.228 1.822 -0.664 28.652 
LIQUIDITY it 124 0.079873 0.206706 0.012406 0.026796 0.073368 0.00000 2.031702 
ROAit 90 0.381145 11.35542 -0.40725 0.737 4.09225 -71.658 17.307 
 
Panel C: 2010 





SEC-GAIN it 71 0.006407 0.025225 0 0.000014 0.00031 0.003944 0.170963 
MEET it 71 0.577465 0.497479 0 1 1 0 1 
CAIB, it 65 4.031384 12.08958 -1.54 -1.45 2.89 -1.45 40.46 
REDRB, it 65 -0.00031 29.60198 -3.675 1.8 7.09 -87.15 169.14 
RIDRB, it 65 0.001538 3.756628 -2.395 0.37 2.39 -12.48 7.8 
PRESEC-
EAR it 71 0.068115 0.186212 
-0.00006 0.000042 0.060571 
-0.170963 0.964404 
SIZE it 59 9.330365 2.721738 7.408278 9.15173 11.06695 3.633922 14.63305 
ROAit 49 8.863857 34.90148 




SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in year 
t.  
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.6 
CAIB, it = (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.  
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): Difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s average return. 
RID RB, it = ( kIt  - kit ): Difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and the firm’s cost of 
capital. 
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy for manager 
incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the 
SEC. 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.  
                                                             





BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.  
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.  
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.  
 
 
 Table 3-3 is presented in three panels to show the correlation matrices for 
companies from three time periods. As indicated in this table, some of the variables have 
significant (indicated by * as marginally significant or p-value between 0.05 and 0.1, ** 
as significant or p-value between .01 and 0.05, and *** as highly significant or p-value 
less than 0.01) relationship with each other; however, none of the correlations are of high 
magnitude7.  The common rule of thumb for identifying multicollinearity is a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of 10 or more, or a tolerance of 0.1 or less. Another way is to 
examine the bivariate correlations between independent variables and look for correlation 
of 0.7 or higher. Lastly, muticollinearity may be present when the overall model is 
significant but none of the independent variables are significant. After dropping variables 
that show a high bivariate correlation, my analysis does not show any of the above 













                                                             
7 As a rule of thumb, there is a serious correlation between two variables when the magnitude 





Correlation Matrices for Paper Two (companies following U.S. GAAP) 
Panel A: period 2005-2006. 
Variable MEETit CAIB, it REDRB, it RIDRB, it PRESEC-EARit SIZEit BETAit 
MEETit 1             
CAIB, it  -0.079 1           
REDRB, it 0.0872 0.0023 1         
RIDRB, it 0.0279 0.0000 -0.1957* 1       
PRESEC-
EARit 
-0.041 -0.034 0.0485 -0.049 1     
SIZEit 0.1396 -0.1842** 0.3573*** 0.0321 0.0807 1   
BETAit 0.0995 0.1124 0.4489*** 0.005 -0.0139 0.3724*** 1 
LIQUIDITYit 0.1268 0.0873 -0.0033 -0.095 0.0399 -0.2447*** -0.1031 
 
 
Panel B: period 2008-2009. 
Variable MEETit CAIB, it REDRB, it RIDRB, it PRESEC-EARit SIZEit BETAit LIQUIDITYit 
MEETit 1               
CAIB, it -0.2634*** 1             
REDRB, it -0.018 -0.0001 1           
RIDRB, it -0.0583 0.0001 0.1157 1         
PRESEC-EARit 0.0841 -0.066 0.0056 -0.046 1       
SIZEit 0.2227** -0.3683*** 0.1254 0.1623* -0.0029 1     
BETAit 0.0785 -0.0762 0.0327 0.1534* 0.0181 0.0831 1   
LIQUIDITYit 0.1542* 0.1061 0.1088 -0.045 -0.0349 -0.1957** -0.01 1 













Correlation Matrices for Paper Two (Continued) 
Panel C: period 2010. 
Variable MEETit CAIB, it REDRB, it RIDRB, it PRESEC-EARit SIZEit 
MEETit 1           
CAIB, it -0.132 1         
REDRB, it -0.118 0 1       
RIDRB, it 0.0434 0 -0.04 1     
PRESEC-EARit 0.1509 -0.1135 0.1003 -0.0979 1   
SIZEit 0.1603 -0.1868 0.119 0.2602** 0.2301* 1 
ROAit 0.089 -0.0827 0.1101 -0.1593 0.2013 0.2102 
Note:  
1- Pearson correlation is reported in the above tables. Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1% are represented by *, **, and ***. 
2- To test for multicollinearity among variables, the Variance Inflation Index was used and 
no serious correlation was detected. 
Where: 
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.8 
CAIB, it = (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.  
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): Difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s average return. 
RID RB, it = ( kIt  - kit ): Difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and the firm’s cost of 
capital. 
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy for manager 
incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the 
SEC. 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.  
BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.  
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.  
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.  
 
 Table 3-4 is a summary of regression analyses for the three time periods. For the 
first two periods, I used multivariate-panel data-regression models to examine whether 
                                                             





companies reporting gain from securitization activities are likely to have manipulated 
earnings, or if any relationship exists between their competitive advantage variables and 
the securitization gain.  
 The results for period 2005-2006 indicate: 1) a strong positive association 
between securitization gain and meeting/beating earnings forecasts, which supports the 
hypothesis of this dissertation; 2) on the other hand, a highly significant negative 
association between PRESEC-EAR (proxy for manager’s motivation for earnings 
management)9 and securitization gain. Taken together, the overall results for 2005-2006 
(the period when mortgage companies and financial institutions were strong in generating 
loans and selling them) support my hypothesis and are consistent with findings by 
Dechow et al (2010).  The significant negative coefficient of PRESEC-EAR shows that 
managers had the motivation and opportunity to sell loans and earn positive income. 
 The second part of Table 3-4 represents the results for the period 2008-2009. As 
indicated in the table, there is no significant association between securitization gain, the 
dependent variable, and MEET, which indicates that securitization gain during this period 
(after the crisis) was not associated with earnings management. My interpretation of this 
result is that companies were under more scrutiny after the crisis and also, because of the 
problems with the mortgage companies, the number and magnitude of securitization 
activities had dropped significantly. However, the result shows significant negative 
association between one of two components of competitive advantage and SEC-GAIN. 
                                                             
9 PRESEC-EAR is net income before the gain from securitization; therefore, when PRESEC-




This result points out that competitive advantage could adversely affect securitization 
activities. The result also shows significant negative association between PRESEC-EAR 
and securitization gain, which means that managers still had the motivation to manage 
earnings. This finding is consistent with the severe economic crisis in the economy. 
 The last three columns of the table present results for 2010, in which a new 
standard, SFAS 166, was implemented. This change is expected to be reflected in 
companies’ annual reports. My explanation for not having any significant relationship 
between meeting/beating forecast and SEC_GAIN during this period is that under the 
new standard, it is harder for companies to meet the conditions for sale accounting. 
Furthermore, the secured borrowing increases the amount of leverage on financial 
statements, which is generally not desirable.  Nevertheless, my results do not show any 
association between the components of competitive advantage and securitization gain. 
This indicates that companies’ competitive advantage is not responsible for securitization 
gain during this period. I should note that the explanatory power of the model in the first 
two periods is high (R-squared of 0.45 and 0.61, respectively), but it is low in the last 
period (R-squared of 0.01). The low explanatory power of the model in the third period 










 Regression Results for Paper Two (for companies following U.S. GAAP) 
 
SEC-GAINit = β0 + β1MEETit +   β2 CAIB, it+ β3REDRB, jt + β4RIDRB, jt +  
β5PRESEC-EARjt + β6SIZEit + β7LIQUDITYit + Β8BETAit  + β9ROAit + εj 
 

















MEETit 0.0335847*** 3.16 0.002 0.0002844 0.14 0.893 0.0017131 0.43 0.671 
 
CAIB, it 0.0016206 0.65 0.516 -0.001530*** -4.29 0.000 -0.0001058 -0.59 0.561 
 
REDRB, it 0.0005315 0.74 0.459 0.0000439 0.84 0.404 0.0000504 0.61 0.547 
 
RIDRB, it -0.0021454 -1.27 0.203 -0.0001185 -0.48 0.632 -0.0004267 -0.87 0.392 
 
PRESEC-EARit -0.350433*** -4.96 0.000 -0.975104*** -63.94 0.000 -0.0100657 -0.99 0.329 
 
SIZEit 0.0048983 0.97 0.332 0.0004201 0.98 0.327 0.0006031 0.69 0.492 
 
LIQUDITYit -0.1612803** -2.52 0.012 -0.0092278** -2.14 0.032 - - - 
 
BETAit -0.0036547 -0.35 0.729 -0.0000203 -0.07 0.946 - - - 
 
ROAit -0.0000373 -0.34 0.733 -0.00000165 -0.02 0.986 -0.000027 -0.56 0.58 
 
Cons. -0.0337832 -0.58 0.565 0.0282041*** 3.32 0.001 -0.002533 -0.28 0.78 
Adj. r-squared: 0.4548 ***   0.6131***   0.0107   
 (Note: Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***.) 
Where: 
SEC-GAINit: The gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in 
year t.  
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise.10 
CAIB, it= (irIt - kIt): The industry-based competitive advantage.  
RED RB, it = ( irit - irIt ): Difference between the firm’s return and the industry’s average return. 
RID RB, it = ( kIt  - kit ): Difference between the industry’s average cost of capital and the firm’s cost of 
capital. 
PRESEC-EARit: Earnings before securitization gain for firm i in year t (also is a proxy for manager 
incentive for earnings management). All earnings data are collected from companies’ 10-Ks filed with the 
SEC. 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.  
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t.  
BETAit: Market-specific risk for firm i in year t.  
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t.  
                                                             






 Securitization is a new concept and practice, and many individuals are not 
familiar with its complicated process. Securitization has become a popular method of 
financing over the past few decades. Nevertheless, prior studies show that the accounting 
standards related to securitization (e.g. fair-value accounting) can be misused by 
managers to smooth, time, or manipulate earnings (Karaoglu 2005; Hunton et al. 2006; 
Dechow et al. 2010). Barth and Taylor (2010) suggest that gain from securitization could 
also be a result of the company’s competitive advantage, from a special ability or a 
unique resource.  
 I have used all companies that reported securitization gain during 2005-2006 
(before the financial crisis), 2008-2009 (after the crisis), and 2010 (when financial 
statements reflected the impact of SFAS 16611). That is, my study consists of 355 firm-
year observations. The result of regression analysis shows that there is a significant 
association between meeting/beating earnings forecast and securitization gain during the 
period before the crisis. However, there is no positive relationship between securitization 
gain and competitive advantage for any time period. Also, there is no indication of 
earnings management for the period 2008-2010. It is argued, but it has not yet been 
proven, that companies have become more conservative since the issuance of SFAS 166.   
I believe that after the crisis year of 2007, companies were under more scrutiny, 
and also mortgage companies were facing many challenges, so the number and 
                                                             
11 The criteria for securitization transaction under SFAS 140 are criticized for being too easy 




magnitude of securitization activities dropped significantly. However, the result shows 
significant negative association between one of two components of competitive 
advantage and SEC-GAIN. This result points out that competitive advantage could 
adversely affect securitization activities. The result also shows significant negative 
association between PRESEC-EAR and securitization gain, which means that managers 
still had the motivation to manage earnings. This finding is consistent with the severe 
economic crisis. I also show that after FASB Statement 166 became effective at the 
beginning of 2010, it became harder for companies to meet the conditions for sale 
accounting, so the opportunity for earnings management declined. Lastly, I show that a 


















PAPER THREE: SECURITIZATION, INVESTORS’  
PROTECTION AND VALUE RELEVANCE  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
In this part of my dissertation, I first investigate the impact of securitization gain 
on the value-relevance of accounting information. My next focus is on earnings 
management through securitization transactions by companies operating in different 
countries with a variety of laws and law enforcement regimes that follow International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). European regulators have required the companies 
operating in the European Union countries to adopt the IFRS since the beginning of 2005. 
The main objectives of this paper are to examine the market relevance of an accounting 
performance measure, return on equity, for companies that are engaged in securitization 
transactions, as well as to investigate the dual impacts of different legal systems and 
levels of investor protection on earnings management using asset securitization .  
Securitization is a fast and easy approach for generating cash and transferring the 
risk of holding assets to a third party. Securitization occurs in different areas, from 
corporate loans, home loans, and personal loans to store credit cards, auto leases, and 
even song royalties. in many ways, securitization benefits a company. However, because 
of the complexity of issues and accounting standards related to securitization, problems 
may arise from the securitization process. Prior studies show that managers can use their 





Jenson and Meckling (1976) define: 
“…an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe 
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal.” 
 
Based on the Agency theory, investors usually have little faith in management. 
Therefore, investors do not place high value on managers’ decisions, particularly when 
those decisions involve complex processes and ambiguous outcomes.   
One of the accounting methods related to the securitization process that can give 
discretion to managers is fair-value accounting, which involves the estimation of 
unobservable asset values (Dechow et al. 2009). Fair-value accounting rules have been 
criticized for their complexity and vagueness, which could result in estimation errors or 
in earnings management (Barth and Landsman 1995; Fiechter and Meyer 2009; Zhou 
2009).  
In addition to problems with fair-value accounting, securitization transactions 
may have varying results in different countries because of factors such as differing 
accounting standards, legal systems, and levels of investor protection. The complexity 
tangled with accounting for securitization, and the differences in accounting standards 
and legal systems, make the resulting financial reports harder to compare across countries 
(Paananen 2009). Therefore, this topic is very important to participants in international 




are all interested in the quality of financial reports and whether financial reports represent 
the true picture of a firm’s performance and financial position.   
 In this paper, I examine the value-relevance of securitization gain for companies 
that follow the U.S. GAAP, are engaged in securitization transaction, and have complete 
data for 2005-2006 and 2008-2010. Then I investigate the effects of different levels of 
investor protection on earnings management, using asset securitization for companies that 
follow IFRS, are engaged in securitization, and have complete data for 2005-2006 and 
2008-2010. I expect to contribute to the literature by: 1) showing the impact of asset 
securitization on the value-relevance of return on equity (ROE) as a measure of 
accounting performance and 2) showing that countries with stronger investor protection 
experience less earnings management using securitization gain. The results of this study 
can be used by standard-setters and policy-makers when evaluating the standards and 
rules related to asset securitization.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  First, I offer background and 
explanation on some important issues and then continue with hypothesis development, 
data collection, empirical tests, results, and conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Value Relevance 
Securitization became a popular method of financing during the past few decades, 
and already by the end of the first quarter of 2007 there were 8.9 trillion dollars in asset-
backed securities outstanding (Bond Market Association). The securitization process is 




financial institutions. The complexity of securitization transaction is due to its 
involvement with different accounting standards (e.g. fair-value accounting) and legal 
issues (relating to bankruptcy, tax, securities, and financial).   
As I mentioned before, companies securitize a variety of assets, from credit-card 
receivables to mortgage loans, auto loan, and trade receivables. Prior studies show that 
investors are unable to easily value these types of assets (Berlin and Loeys 1988; 
Diamond 1989). Other studies claim and show that investors grant higher value to 
earnings when earnings exclude the securitization gain (e.g., Niu & Richardson 2006).  
In this dissertation, I argue that the complexity of securitization transaction caused 
by the complexity of fair-value accounting increases information asymmetry and 
disagreement between investors and management, and hence decreases the value-
relevance of accounting performance measures. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H1: Securitization gain decreases the value-relevance of accounting performance 
measures in term of return on equity.  
 
Investor protection 
Securitization originated when a government-sponsored entity, the Government 
National Mortgage Association, known as “Ginnie Mae”, started selling mortgage-
backed securities in 1970 (Senterfitt 2006). A very common practice for most companies 
is to sell their receivables. Before the rise of the recent financial crisis, this practice was 
very popular, and firms used securitization to generate cash in order to lend to new 
customers. Beside the differences in accounting standards across countries, securitization 




 Currently, 117 countries with different legal systems and different levels of 
investor protection require or allow their firms to follow IFRS (Chadha 2010). Therefore, 
in this paper, I use companies that are engaged in asset securitization transactions, follow 
IFRS, and operate under different levels of investor protection, and investigate the 
earnings management using the assets securitization process. The issue of interest is 
whether strengthening investor protection can increase the quality of financial reports 
through reduced earnings management for adopters of IFRS.  Prior studies show that 
firms in countries with a high level of investor protection are better valued (La Porta et al. 
2002).  
 Investors are generally willing to pay more for financial assets when they face 
lower risk and feel their investments are better protected by laws. La Porta et al. (2000) 
claim and show that the quality of corporate governance in a country depends on the level 
of investor protection, and study shows that larger companies offer more information in 
countries with a high level of investor protection (Paananen 2009). La Porta et al. (1997) 
examine capital markets in 49 countries and find that countries with a lower level of 
investor protection have smaller equity and debt markets. Therefore, the size and the 
health of a country’s capital market depend on regulations and the enforcement of those 
laws and regulations (La Porta et al. 1997). As an example, investors in Italy, Germany, 
and France are not as well-protected by strong legal systems as are investors in the 
United States (Hung 2001). 
Basically, the legal systems of countries around the world can be grouped based 




origins in English law, and civil laws, which were based on Roman law. Leuz et al. 
(2003) groups countries into three categories based on their similarities in legal and 
institutional features. This classification is similar to La Porta et al. (1997), who grouped 
countries into code-law and common-law. Basically, scholars focus on the background 
and development of legal systems and the source of regulations among other issues to 
group countries into two major categories, common law and civil-law countries. Civil-
law generated from Roman law and depends heavily on scholars’ development of 
regulations and codes.  
Three families of laws are recognized in the civil tradition: French, German, and 
Scandinavian. The French family was started in France under Napoleon and spread out to 
other countries in Europe and other parts of the globe via French soldiers. Italy, Poland, 
West Germany, part of Africa, Indochina, Oceania, Portugal, and Spain were influenced 
by French civil law, which, in turn, impacted the South American countries colonized by 
Spain and Portugal. German law code was developed later and has influenced countries 
in Europe and Asia. Some of the countries influenced by German law code are Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan, and Korea. The third 
family, the Scandinavian, is not as close to Roman law as are the other two families, and 
the four Nordic countries use this law with some national variations.  
England’s laws and the laws of those countries influenced by English law are part 
of common-law, which is developed by judges through the resolution of particular 
disputes. These laws moved to the British colonies such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, 




differences in laws across countries (La Porta et al. 1998). La Porta et al. (1998) also find 
evidence that investors’ legal rights are fewer in civil-law countries, and investors in 
common-law counties enjoy the highest level of protection. Also, regulations are better 
enforced in the common-law countries than in civil (code)-law counties.   
 Pagano et al. (1998) argue that only a few very large companies go public in 
Europe.  The authors suggest that minority property rights are not protected in most 
European countries and, therefore, young and small firms are not able to attract investors. 
La Porta et al. (1997) argue that countries differ in their legal systems protection of 
investors, and they also enforce their rules and laws differently. They put countries into 
four categories, based on the origin of their legal systems. The first category includes 
countries that follow English law (common law1) which is created by judges.  The other 
three categories are countries that follow French, Germany, or Scandinavians laws (civil 
law), which are created by scholars and legislators. La Porta et al. (1997) compare the 
legal rules and enforcement of 49 countries and find that stricter investor-protection rules 
are in place and better enforced in countries that follow common laws, and as a result, 
both shareholders and creditors are better protected in these countries. They also find that 
investors in French civil law countries have the lowest protection and quality of legal 
rules, and the levels of enforcement of rules in German civil law and Scandinavian civil 
law countries are in the middle.  
                                                             
1 The background on legal systems are similar to previous studies (i.e., La Porta et al. 1997, 




La Porta et al. (1997) also find that companies located in common-law countries 
have better external-financing resources, and common-law countries have, on average, 
three times more outsider stockholders than French-civil-law countries. They conclude 
that legal rules and the enforcement of those rules play important roles in the capital 
market of a country. Mahoney (2001) finds evidence that the economy in common-law 
countries grows faster than in civil-law countries.   
Leuz et al. (2003) examine the level of earnings management in companies from 
31 countries around the world between 1990 and 1999 and find negative association 
between earnings management and the quality of both legal enforcement and minority 
shareholders’ rights.  High-quality legal systems protect outsiders, investors, by reducing 
the ability of the insiders, management, to misuse inside information for their own 
benefit. Strong investor protection makes sure that contract terms are followed and 
management is disciplined when needed. Leuz et al. (2003) measure the outside-investor 
protection by looking at minority-shareholders rights and the quality of the country’s 
legal system. 
 Managers are generally against regulations that may reduce their freedom in 
selecting accounting alternatives or require them to provide more information to the 
public (Hunton et al. 2006). In code-law countries, firms are allowed to utilize alternative 
methods of accounting; therefore, managers have more opportunities to manipulate the 
earnings, and this suggests that the probability of earnings-smoothing is higher in code-




La Porta et al. (1998) examine the quality of regulations protecting shareholders’ 
rights and the laws that enforce those regulations. They find that common-law countries 
have stronger rules for protecting investors and are better able to enforce their 
regulations. Leuz et al. (2003) show a lower frequency of earnings manipulation in 
countries in which investor protection is strong. 
Other studies provide evidence that the convergence of U.S. GAAP with IFRS 
improves the comparability of financial reports; nevertheless, a strong and effective legal 
system is necessary for this convergence to have positive results (Bradshow and Miller 
2007). However, Street and Gray (2001) find that for some Western European countries 
such as Germany and France, compliance with IAS is lower.  
In this section, I investigate the association between investor protection and 
earnings management measured by beating or meeting analysts’ forecasts for companies 
that follow IFRS and are engaged in securitization transactions. Therefore, I investigate 
the association between securitization gain and earnings management for companies that 
operate in different countries with different legal systems and different investor 
protection. I use meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for earnings 
management. Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
H2: Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts for companies that use securitization 
transactions is lower in countries with stronger investor protection. 
 
III. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY 






Data Collection  
I used LexisNexis and several keywords to find companies in the U.S. and in the 
world that have used securitization transactions during the periods 2005-2006 and 2008-
2010 and have almost all of the related data. I have come up with a total of 355 company-
year observations for 71 companies that follow the U.S. GAAP, and a total of 205 
company-year observations for 41 companies that follow IFRS. Dechow et al. (2010) 
made a similar study in the period between 2000 and 2005 and collected a total of 96 
companies. Given that the amount of securitization activities has declined significantly 
since the 2000-2005 period, I believe the chance that I have missed any company that is 
engaged in securitization activities and is not on my list is extremely low. Finding 
information for non-U.S. companies has been extremely hard and time-consuming. The 
companies for which I was able to collect data disclose information using different 
terminology. I had to use “securitization”, “securitisation”, “financial asset”, “loan and 
receivable”, and many more keywords to find firms’ information about financial and 
securitization activities. Some accounting systems do not explicitly require the disclosure 
of all activities and information. LexisNexis and Google Finance were my main sources 
of data collection for IFRS companies. The remaining data were collected using: a) the 
Research Insights (COMPUSTAT) database to collect financial data, b) the CRSP 
database to collect daily and monthly stock returns and stock prices, c) the SEC’s Edgar 
database to look at the firms’ 10-K reports, and d) the Database of the Institutional 




My study consists of 355 company-year observation for a total of 71 U.S. companies and 
205 company-year observations for a total of 41 IFRS companies.   
Methodology 
Value Relevance: 
In this section I examine the effects of securitization gain on market value of 
stocks for companies that are engaged in securitization transactions and follow the U.S. 
GAAP. Examining this issue is important because securitization is a method of financing, 
and securitization gain is an addition to the earnings. In this study, I examine the value-
relevance of an accounting performance measure, return on equity, for companies that 
follow U.S. GAAP and are engaged in securitization transactions.   
I collected both price and the number of shares outstanding from the CRSP 
database. I used the following model to test the first hypothesis of this dissertation. 
 
 MKT_VALit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit +   β2 ROEit + β3SEC-ROEit + β4ROE_LAGit 
Β5SIZEit + β6LVRGit + β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SEGit + εit                             … (3-1) 
                                  
Where:  
MKT_VALit: Market value of the equity at the end of the period scaled by total assets for 
firm i in year t     
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t     
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t     
SEC-ROEit: Interaction variable between SEC-GAIN and ROE for firm i in year t     
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t     




LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t     
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t     
Proxies for Investor Protection: 
It is well established by prior studies that investors are better protected in 
common-law countries (La Porta et al. 1996, 1998; Johnson et al. 2000; Glaezer et al. 
2001). Therefore, I use two proxies for investor protection which have been used in prior 
studies (e.g., Hung 2001). The first proxy for investor protection is the legal system, 
grouping countries into common-law and code-law. As did La Porta et al. (1997), I use 
Reynolds and Flores (1989) to categorize countries into legal families (common/code).  
Investing in a company entitles the shareholder to voting rights, choosing 
directors and participating in critical corporation decision-making. Therefore, countries 
with higher-quality regulations and stronger law enforcement grant investors more power 
to exercise their rights. La Porta et al. (1996) show that strong anti-director rights highly 
encourage outside investors to participate in the market and discourage opportunism by 
managers. Consequently, the second proxy for investor protection is the anti-director 
rights index (ANTI) developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and employed by Hung (2001). 
This index is based on answers to the following five questions. Each country starts with 
zero points and gains one point when the country’s action supports shareholders: 
1- One point if country’s rules allow stockholders to vote via mail, and zero points if 
stockholders must vote in person.  
2- One point if shareholders are not required to deposit their shares before shareholder 




3- One point if the country permits cumulative voting for directors and zero points 
otherwise. 
4- One point when a shareholder with less than 5% of share capital is entitled to call for 
an extraordinary shareholder meeting. (Minority shareholders have more difficulty 
calling the meeting when the benchmark percentage is higher.) 
5- One point for countries that allow the minority shareholders to take legal action 
against the directors.  
Earnings Management: 
In this section, I investigate earnings management through securitization under different 
levels of investor protection.  Therefore, I use the following model to test my second 
hypothesis.  
  
SEC-GAINit =β0 + β1MEETit+   β2 PRESEC-EARit+ β3MEET-ANTIit+ β4MEET-
LEGALit + β5ANTIit + β6ANTIit +  β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SIZEit + β9ROAit + εit       
                                                                                                                                                                              … (3-2)   
                                             
Where: 
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the 
SEC for firm i in year t 
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise 
for firm i in year t 
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t 
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t 




MEET-ANTIit: Interaction between MEET and ANTI for firm i in year t   
MEET-LEGALit: Interaction between MEET and LEGAL for firm i in year t 
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t   
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t  
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t 
IV. RESULTS 
Previously in this dissertation, I found evidence of earnings management during 
2005-2006 for U.S. companies. In this section, I examine whether the securitization gain 
also reduces the value-relevance of an accounting measure, return on equity, in the U.S. 
market.  Table 4-1 shows descriptive statistics for 355 company-year observations for 71 
companies that follow U.S. GAAP, covering all three periods (2005-2006; 2008-2009; 
2010). Using the residual analysis, all outliers are detected and removed from the 


















Descriptive Statistics for Paper Three (companies following U.S. GAAP) 
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses) 
Panel A: 2005-2006 






75th %tile Min Max 






823.1911 .0313843 1506.515 






0.000241 0.000000 0.830171 






0.035977 -59.70085 159.9353 






10.78 1.97 14.45 






0.011179 -0.0000005 37.19008 






0.913319 0.0786421 6.530481 






0.055699 0.0000000 3.570135 






4 1 10 
Panel B: 2008-2009 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
25th %tile Median 75th %tile 
Min Max 






627.2644 .0238447 1694.786 






0.010217 0.00000 0.490933 






0.013441 -167.565 495.8103 






11.0027 3.619851 14.6145 






0.009363 -8.5E-05 0.05015 






0.90164 0.005402 1.737622 






0.073368 0.000000 2.031702 






4 1 10 
Panel C: 2010 
Variable  Obs Mean   Std. Dev. 
25th %tile Median 75th %tile 
Min Max 






791.5049 12.765 1661.338 






0.000310 0.000000 0.170963 






6.056313 -0.82136 96.4404 






11.06695 3.633922 14.63305 






0.889623 0.156986 3.814057 












MKT_VALit: Market value of the equity at the end of the period scaled by total assets for firm i in year t     
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t     
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t     
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t     
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t       
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t     
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t     
 
The LIQUIDITY variable is dropped in 2010 because of its small number of 
observations. 
Table 4-2 contains the correlation matrices for the three periods of this study. No 
problematic correlation among independent variables is observed except for MK-BK, 
which is dropped from regression analyses. Just as with my detailed explanations in the 
earlier section, the results do not show any sign of multicollinearity.  
 
Table 4-2 
Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (companies following U.S. GAAP) 
 
Panel A: 2005-2006 
  SEC-GAINit ROEit SIZEit MK-BKit LVRGit LIQUIDITYit 
SEC-GAINit 1           
ROEit 0.1794** 1         
SIZEit 0.0667 0.1378 1       
MK-BKit 0.1156 0.379*** 0.219 1     
LVRGit 0.0214 0.0009 -0.1457 0.0195 1   
LIQUIDITYit -0.0738 -0.0174 -0.2447*** -0.0271 -0.062 1 














Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (Continued) 
Panel B: 2008-2009 
  SEC-GAINit ROEit SIZEit MK-BKit LVRGit LIQUIDITYit 
SEC-GAINit 1           
ROEit 0.2301*** 1         
SIZEit 0.0958 0.0556 1       
MK-BKit 0.1867 0.0504 0.6863*** 1     
LVRGit 0.1137 0.0787 0.5142*** 0.4087*** 1   
LIQUIDITYit -0.0383 -0.05 -0.1957** -0.1168 -0.2876*** 1 
SEGit -0.0298 -0.073 0.180**3 0.1531* 0.0117 0.06 
 
Panel C: 2010 
  SEC-GAINit ROEit SIZEit MK-BKit LVRGit 
SEC-GAINit 1         
ROEit -0.0823 1       
SIZEit 0.0039 0.2339*** 1     
MK-BKit 0.3743 0.007 0.7382*** 1   
LVRGit -0.0454 -0.0077 0.05 0.3805 1 
LIQUIDITYit 0.0912 -0.0322 0.1816 -0.3365 0.0587 
 
Where:  
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t     
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t     
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t     
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t       
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t     
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t     
 
 The results of multivariate panel data regression for the first two periods, as well 
as the results for cross sectional model of the last period, are presented in Table 4-3. As 
the results show, the coefficient of ROE as well as the coefficient of interaction between 
ROE and securitization gain is not significant, indicating the lack of value-relevance for 




(2006), who conclude that securitization gains receive lower value by market. This 
finding does not support my second hypothesis for any period.  The results also show that 
the coefficient of leverage is not significant in the period before the financial crisis year 
(2005-2006), indicating that investors have not penalized companies for their leverage 
before 2007. However, the coefficient of leverage is highly significant and negative after 
the crisis year (2008-2009 and 2010), indicating that the investors have become more 
sensitive about the companies borrowing after the crisis year and penalized them for their 
reported debt.   
 
Table 4-3 
 Regression Results for Paper Three (companies following U.S. GAAP) 
 
MKT_VALit = β0 + β1SEC-GAINit +   β2 ROEit + β3SEC-ROEit + β4ROE_LAGit 
Β5SIZEit + β6LVRGit + β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SEGit + εit 
 
















SEC-GAINit -1852.75 -0.37 0.711 -783.7502 -0.6 0.551 4257.369 1.05 0.301 
ROEit 0.323248 0.03 0.979 -1.640679 -0.8 0.425 4.087757 0.56 0.582 
SEC-ROEit 34.71619 0.28 0.78 593.3049 1.05 0.293 246.9704 0.23 0.819 
ROE_LAGit 6.313194 0.4 0.687 -1.973393 -0.8 0.422 3.719184 0.57 0.571 
SIZEit -511.72*** -2.9 0.004 -158.9867 -0.2 0.841 48.37349 1.09 0.285 
LVRGit -142.538 -0.32 0.748  -253.997*** -3.79 0.000 -3725.28*** -7.78 0.000 
LIQUIDITYit -1093.76*** -3.37 0.001 -323.0681 -0.1 0.92 -41.69201 -1.18 0.245 
SEGit 5.785015 0.04 0.968 -1.710824 -0.04 0.967 42.57369 1.05 0.301 





squared: 0.4482***   0.5259***   0.5788***   
(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***) 
 
Where:  




SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization scaled by total equity for firm i in year t     
ROEit: Return on equity as a proxy for accounting performance for firm i in year t     
SEC-ROEit: Interaction variable between SEC-GAIN and ROE for firm i in year t     
ROE_LAGit : Lag of Return on Equity for firm i in year t 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is used as a risk proxy for firm i in year t     
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t       
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t     
SEGit: Number of operating segments for firm i in year t     
 
I have adopted information from prior research to create Table 4-4, which consists 
of two proxies for investor protection (La Porta et al. 1996, 1998; Hung 2001). Legal 
system (LEGL) represents the legal system of the country, which is equal to one if the 
country has common-law system and zero if the country follows code-law system. Anti-
director index was created by La Porta (1996) and used in many studies. The index is 
ranged from zero to five and calculated based on the answers to 5 specific questions 
listed on La Porta et al. (1998).  
 
Table 4-4 
Anti-director index and Legal system 
 
Country Legal system Anti-director Index 
Australia 1 4 
France 0 2 
Germany 0 1 
Ireland 1 3 
Netherland 0 2 
Spain 0 2 
Switzerland 0 1 





Table 4-5 represents descriptive statistics for companies that follow IFRS for the three 
periods of this study. I scaled the securitization gain (SEC-GAIN) and net income before 
securitization gain (PRESEC-EAR) by total stockholders’ equity. Using the residual 
analysis, all outliers are detected and removed from the regression analysis. In the 
residual analysis, I ran the original model and calculated the residual-squared, then 
plotted the residual-squared against each independent variable to find outliers.   
 
Table 4-5 
Descriptive Statistics for Paper Three (companies following IFRS) 
(Year 2007 is the crises year and is excluded from the analyses) 
 
Panel A: 2005-2006 






75th %tile Min Max 






0.0128746 0.00000 0.910598 






1 0 1 






0.175138 -0.62813 10.4709 






4 1 5 






1 0 1 






0.957328 0.00000 0.993505 






0.0621536 0.000593 0.282788 






20.02763 12.50103 26.1 




















Descriptive Statistics for Paper Three (Continued) 
 
Panel B: 2008-2009 






75th %tile Min Max 






0.017976 0.00000 0.551792 






1 0 1 






0.088587 -0.51548 0.770801 






4 1 5 






1 0 1 






0.9534939 0 1.003593 






0.0604727 0.000001 0.24 






20.29982 12.16645 26.4 






0.99 -44.38 100 
 
Panel C: 2010 






75th %tile Min Max 






0.0145284 0.0000 0.443686 






1 0 1 






0.0741762 -1.18472 0.957723 






4 1 5 






1 0 1 






0.9540754 0.002057 0.99725 






0.0642847 0.000417 0.251354 






20.81655 12.23658 26.4 






2.0175 -22.1 100 
 
Where: 
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in year 
t 
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise for firm i in year t 
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t 
ANTIit: Anti-director index for firm i in year t 
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t 




LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t  
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t 
 
Table 4-6 presents correlation matrices for companies in all three time periods. As 
this table shows, there are a few significant correlations among variables; however, none 
of them is higher than .7, except for LEGAL and ROA variables. The LEGAL variable is 
dropped from the analyses of all three periods, and the ROA is dropped from the first 
period analysis. The common rule of thumb for identifying multicollinearity is a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of 10 or more, or a tolerance of 0.1 or less. Another way is to 
examine the bivariate correlations between independent variables and look for correlation 
of 0.7 or higher. Lastly, muticollinearity may be present when the overall model is 
significant but none of the independent variables are significant. After dropping variables 
that show a high bivariate correlation, my analysis does not show any of the above 
symptoms.     
  
Table 4-6 
 Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (companies following IFRS) 
 
Panel A: 2005-2006 
  MEETit PRESEC-EARit ANTIit LEGALit LVRGit LIQUIDITYit SIZEit 
MEETit 1             
PRESEC-EARit 0.0948 1           
ANTIit 0.1953* 0.1858 1         
LEGALit 0.1719 0.0974 0.8187*** 1       
LVRGit 0.0723 0.0795 -0.1223 -0.0479 1     
LIQUIDITYit -0.0865 0.3455** -0.0488 -0.0568 -0.2443** 1   
SIZEit -0.0089 -0.1631 -0.2525** -0.3867*** 0.3267*** -0.3172*** 1 








Correlation Matrices for Paper Three (Continued) 
Panel B: 2008-2009 
  MEETit PRESEC-EARit ANTIit LEGALit LVRGit LIQUIDITYit SIZEit 
MEETit 1             
PRESEC-EARit -0.0031 1           
ANTIit 0.1575 -0.1042 1         
LEGALit 0.1966* -0.0162 0.8187*** 1       
LVRGit -0.0451 -0.04 -0.1988* -0.1483 1     
LIQUIDITYit -0.1677 0.0626 -0.2343** -0.2199 -0.2005* 1   
SIZEit -0.097 -0.1637 -0.1995* -0.3747*** 0.4181*** -0.08 1 
ROAit 0.1394 -0.0899 0.3176*** 0.1853 0.0313 -0.166 -0.037 
 
Panel C: 2010 
  MEETit 
  PRESEC-EARit 
 ANTIit LEGALit LVRGit LIQUIDITYit SIZEit 
MEETit 1             
PRESEC-EARit 0.1059 1           
ANTIit 0.3389** 0.3165** 1         
LEGALit 0.285* 0.1727 0.8187*** 1       
LVRGit -0.1016 -0.2213 -0.2048 -0.2967* 1     
LIQUIDITYit -0.1105 0.1027 -0.0231 -0.0592 -0.3182* 1   
SIZEit 0.0156 -0.1003 -0.1799 -0.3587** 0.446*** -0.1081 1 
ROAit 0.1925 0.1121 0.3308** 0.2188 0.0065 -0.1718 -0.1188 
 
Where: 
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise for firm i in year t 
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t 
ANTIit: Anti-director index for firm i in year t 
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t 
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t   
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t  
ROAit: Return on assets for firm i in year t 
 
To investigate the association between investor protection and earnings management 
using securitization, I use a multivariate-panel data regression to test for the first two 




Table 4-7. The results show that the coefficients of interaction between MEET and 
LEGAL and the interaction between MEET and ANTI are not significant, indicating that 
companies that are engaged in securitization transactions and operate under IFRS 
experience, on average, no earnings management. This finding does not support the first 
hypothesis of this paper. The explanation I can suggest is that IFRS regulations are 
intense enough with regard to securitization to reduce the extent of manipulation of 
financial statements under any type of investor protection. The results also show that, in 
the first two periods, companies that operate under strong anti-director laws experience 
higher securitization gain. Finally, the results show that, in the second and third period, 
the model has higher explanatory power compared to the first period. The difference can 
















 Regression Results for Paper Three (companies following IFRS) 
 
SEC-GAINit =β0 + β1MEETit+   β2 PRESEC-EARit+ β3MEET-ANTIit+ β4MEET-
LEGALit + β5ANTIit + β6ANTIit +  β7LIQUIDITYit + β8SIZEit + β9ROAit + εit 
 
 
















MEETit 0.1190683 1.47 0.141 0.0941344 1.01 0.314 0.086019 0.57 0.574 
PRESEC-EARit -0.0029717 -0.27 0.789 -0.476460*** -7.07 0.000   -0.38359*** -5.48 0.000 
MEET-ANTIit -0.0485189 -1.56 0.119 -0.0189002 -0.45 0.653 -0.015361 -0.26 0.795 
MEET-LEGALit 0.0015855 0.03 0.98 0.0543293 0.54 0.589 0.0246164 0.23 0.823 
ANTIit 0.040972*** 2.57 0.01 0.0496596*** 2.65 0.008 0.0170804 0.75 0.46 
LVRGit -0.0769156 -1.68 0.092 -0.0584866 -0.93 0.354 0.0231975 0.28 0.784 
LIQUIDITYit 0.0100235 0.05 0.961 0.482642 1.46 0.143 0.0076937 0.02 0.986 
SIZEit -0.0000917 -0.02 0.984 -0.0036641 -0.64 0.522 -0.0019458 -0.3 0.766 
ROAit - - - -0.0007621 -0.78 0.437 -0.0008318 -0.66 0.517 
_cons -0.021758 -0.21 0.836 -0.0460575 -0.35 0.726 -0.0350959 -0.26 0.798 
          
Adj. r-squared: 0.1733 *   0.5836 ***   0.4492***   
   
(Significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***) 
   
Where: 
SEC-GAINit: Gain from securitization obtained from company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for firm i in year 
t 
MEETit: Equal to one when there is non-negative earnings surprise and zero otherwise for firm i in year t 
PRESEC-EARit: Pre-securitization earnings for firm i in year t 
LEGALit: A dummy variable for legal system for firm i in year t 
ANTIit: Anti-director index for firm i in year t 
MEET-ANTIit: Interaction between MEET and ANTI for firm i in year t   
MEET-LEGALit: Interaction between MEET and LEGAL for firm i in year t 
LVRGit: Total liability scaled by total assets for firm i in year t   
LIQUIDITYit: Total cash and cash equivalent scaled by total assets for firm i in year t 
SIZEit: Natural log of total assets which is a used as risk proxy for firm i in year t  








In this dissertation, I first used U.S. companies and examined the value-relevance 
of an accounting performance measure, return on equity, for companies engaged in 
securitization transactions. I selected companies from three time periods to capture 
changes in the economy and regulations. My finding does not show any value-relevance 
for securitization gain in any of the three time periods (2005-2006, 2008-2009, 2010). 
This finding does not support my second hypothesis in any period and is not consistent 
with the finding of prior studies (e.g., Niu and Richardson 2006) which shows that 
investors believe that the value-relevance of earnings is higher when securitization gain is 
not included in earnings. The possible explanation for the lack of value-relevance of 
securitization gain in the period before the crisis is the complexity of calculation and the 
unfamiliarity of investors with the securitization process, as well as the existence of 
extensive varieties of securitized assets.  After the crisis year, investors became more 
knowledgeable with the securitization process; however, the securitization activities have 
decreased greatly and lost their significance.   
Then I use IFRS companies and test whether the possibility of earnings 
management using securitization transactions among companies that operate under 
different legal systems and anti-director laws is reduced. I collected data from three time 
periods to capture changes in the economy and regulations. My findings indicate that 
companies that are engaged in securitization transactions and operate under IFRS, on 
average, experience no earnings management. This finding does not support the first 




securitization are intense enough to reduce the extent of manipulation of financial 
statements under any type of investor protection. 
  My findings also show that, in the first two periods, companies that operated 
under strong anti-director laws experienced higher securitization gain. However, the 
results do not show any sign of earnings management (no significant association between 
securitization gain and meet or beat analysts’ forecasts). This indicates that the 
securitization gain under strong anti-director laws did not result from earnings 
management even though I find strong negative association between proxy for managers’ 
incentive for earnings management (income before securitization gain) and securitization 
gain for the last two periods. Finally, the findings indicate that in the second and third 
periods, the model has higher explanatory power compared to the first period. The 















RESULTS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
I. DISCUSSIONS 
Securitization is a popular financing tool through which the seller of financial 
assets (e.g. receivables/loans) can create cash and transfer the risk of holding receivables 
to another party. Depending on how securitization is constructed, it can affect the 
financial reports. If the transaction meets the criteria for sales, set by standard-setters 
(IFRS/FASB), the asset is removed from the balance sheet, and the difference between 
the sale’s proceeds and book value is recognized as gain/lose. However, if the criteria for 
sales are not met, then the asset stays on the balance sheet, and liabilities increase by the 
amount of cash received.  
Even though securitization became a popular financing activity over a short 
period of time and by one quarter of 2007 around nine trillion dollars in asset-backed 
securities were outstanding, most American were not familiar with the complexity 
involved in the securitization process. Therefore, the financial crisis, the fall of large 
banks, and the bailout shocked Americans hard. Thus, studying the complexities related 
to the securitization process and researching accounting standards that may reduce the 
problems is critical. 
Prior studies suggest that managers can take advantage of the flexibility of 
accounting standards (e.g. fair-value accounting) and manage earnings using 
securitization process. Before the SFAS 166 in 2009, managers had no difficulty in 




Statement no. 140, even when the transferor of the asset retained partial interest in the 
securitized asset. Prior research claims that managers used desirable discount rates to 
show higher gains when they estimated the fair value of retained interests.   
In this dissertation, I use different time frames than those used in prior studies, 
and I also include companies that follow IFRS (prior studies only used U.S. companies) 
to investigate the claim made by previous researchers. I included the periods before and 
after financial crises to investigate the impact of changes in market conditions and new 
regulations. Moreover, I included IFRS companies in my study to determine whether 
managers following IFRS have the same attitudes as managers of companies that follow 
U.S. GAPP because over the last few years, the biggest concern of standard-setters 
around the world has been the convergence with IFRS. 
In addition, I investigated whether the companies’ securitization gain is the result 
of their special competitive advantage of some unique abilities/resources or earnings 
management. Another issue which I tested is the possibility of earnings management 
using securitization under different levels of investor protection, and whether the 
securitization activities decrease the value-relevance of accounting numbers. 
II. RESULTS 
My overall results for companies following U.S. GAAP indicate that there is 
evidence of earnings management for the period 2005-2006 (before the financial crisis); 
however, I do not find any indication that the discount rate being used shows higher 
securitization gain. My results also show that there is a significant association between 




crisis. However, there is no positive relationship between securitization gain and 
competitive advantage for any time period. Also, there is no indication of earnings 
management for the period of 2008-2010. It is argued that companies have become more 
conservative after the issuance of SFAS 166.   
My findings also indicate that companies that are engaged in securitization 
transactions and operate under IFRS, on average, experience no earnings management. 
My interpretation is that the IFRS regulations regarding securitization transactions are 
restrictive enough to reduce the extent of manipulation of financial statements under any 
type of investor protection. Furthermore, my findings show that in the first two periods, 
companies operating under strong anti-director laws experienced higher securitization 
gain. Therefore, I can argue that the securitization gain is not as a result of earnings 
management.  
Lastly, my findings indicate a lack of value-relevance of return on equity for 
companies that follow U.S. GAAP. This finding does not support my second hypothesis 
in any period, and is not consistent with the finding of prior studies (e.g., Niu and 
Richardson 2006) which show that investors believe the value-relevance of earnings is 
higher when securitization gain is not included in earnings.  
III. CONTRIBUTIONS 
My dissertation is expected to make several contributions. First, I find evidence of 
earnings manipulation for the period before the crisis for companies that follow U.S. 
GAAP.  However, lack of association between a discount rate used for estimating fair 




responsible for earnings management. This result sheds light on the controversy about 
fair-value accounting in relation with securitization.  
Second, I did not find any sign of earnings management using securitization for 
any time period under IFRS, so I conclude that IFRS provides higher-quality accounting 
policies for securitization, at least compared to SFAS 140. In addition, it is true that the 
result shows no earnings management during 2008 to 2010, but I cannot relate this result 
to the new standard (SFAS 166) because only the financial statement of the period 2010 
was affected by the new standard. Therefore, I conclude that convergence with IFRS in 
relation to accounting for securitization will benefit the U.S. market.  
I have not found earnings management for companies that follow IFRS under any 
level of investor protection. This finding is further evidence to support the idea of 
convergence with IFRS. In addition, my results show that the companies’ competitive 
advantage is not responsible for generating securitization gain by companies that follow 
the U.S. GAAP. Finally, in the last part of the dissertation, I show the impact of 
securitization activities on the value-relevance of accounting performance measures. I 
find no value-relevance for ROE as a measure of accounting performance. To the best of 
my knowledge, these issues are not investigated or addressed in prior studies. 
The policy implication of my findings is to support the convergence of the U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS with respect to securitization. Policy-makers and standard-setters can 
take into account the findings of my study in their decision process. My findings show 
that, after 2006 in the United States on average, there has not been earnings management 




appears that the market participants in the securitization transaction have voluntarily 
changed their behavior and stopped using securitization to manipulate financial 
statements. 
IV. LIMITATIONS 
 The most important limitation of this study has been the data collection for 
companies that follow IFRS. Even though currently more than 117 countries require or 
allow their registered companies to follow IFRS, not all of them have adopted IFRS at the 
same time. This created difficulties findings companies that adopted the IFRS, have 
securitization activities, and have complete data for five years. Another reason for having 
small sample is the fact that companies that follow IFRS are operating under different 
legal systems and use different languages and terms for their financial reporting. 
Furthermore, the economic and financial crises after 2007 have also decreased the 
volume of securitization activities. In short, decreased in the level of securitization 
activities coupled with unavailability of financial data for companies that follow IFR has 
negatively affected my sample size resulting in less power of my tests.  
The one-year observations in 2010 have been another limitation of this study, 
which can be removed in the future when more time-series data will be available. 
Another important caveat is that the securitization is a useful vehicle and source of 
liquidity for most financial institutions, and any excessive restriction on securitization can 
contribute to market inefficiencies and must be avoided. To come up with an optimal 
level of restriction on securitization, academicians and scholars are encouraged to 




 In my study, I have used the anti-director index that has been used in the literature 
since 1996. Another index has recently been developed by La Porta that can be used in 
future related studies. The calculation of this new index requires a lengthy process 
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